“Are humans rational or irrational?” by Sara Thokozani Kamwendo (31 Mar)

Thoko

Ms. Sara Thokozani Kamwendo will be exploring the question “Are humans rational or irrational?”, surveying the history of recent developments in the study of human cognition leading to the field of Behavioural Economics. Her talk will take place on 31 Mar, 6pm, at the Level 1 Common Lounge, Tembusu College, Utown.

If you wish to attend this event, please register at tembusu.nus.edu.sg

“How Predictive Brains Might Distinguish Between Appearance and Reality” by Malcolm Forster (Aug 14)

In philosophy, the problem of appearance and reality is the problem of saying why the appearance of an object to us gives us information about the way the object really is, even though the same object appears different to different people at different times.  A parallel can be drawn between that problem and a hotly debated topic in neuroscience, about which features of neural activities inside the brain (the “appearances”) carry information about the external world (the “reality”).  The problem of explicating a semantic notion of “carrying information” has also been tackled by philosophers in the past (Fred Dretske, Denny Stampe, Jerry Fodor, and more recently, Brian Skyrms, 2010, Signals).  This talk will argue that the general approach to this problem taken by neuroscientists and these philosophers is fundamentally wrong.  The argument is premised on recent work on causality known as Bayesian causal networks (e.g., Judea Pearl, 2000, 2009).  Once neural networks are re-described as Bayes nets, there is a sharp distinction between internal probabilistic dependencies that can be explained by internal causal connections and those that cannot.  Only those that cannot be explained internally carry information about the external world. The talk will end with a discussion about how this version of naturalistic semantics, Wisconsin style, bears on the philosophical problem of appearance and reality.

Philosophy Department Seminar
Date: Thursday, 14 Aug 2014
Time: 3.30pm – 5.30pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Malcolm Forster, University of Wisconsin at Madison
Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

About the Speaker:

forsterProfessor Malcolm R. Forster is Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin at Madison. His research has focused on issues in the methodology of science, particularly the role of simplicity and unification in confirmation and in statistics, as well as William Whewell’s methodology of science applied to planetary astronomy (the latest publication being M. Forster (2011) “The Debate between Whewell and Mill on the Nature of Scientific Induction”, in Stephan Hartmann (ed.), The Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 10: Inductive Logic (Elsevier Science, pp. 91-113.). In 2010, he also applied Whewell’s consilience of inductions to quantum physics (“The Miraculous Consilience of Quantum Mechanics”, in Ellery Eells and James Fetzer (eds.), 2010, Probability and Science), and he is now expanding and developing an earlier project applying the method of Bayes Causal Nets to understanding various results in the foundations of quantum mechanics.

“Moderately Naturalistic Metaphysics” by Tuomas Tahko (20 Feb)

The paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 20 Feb 2014
Time: 2 pm – 4 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Tuomas Takho, Research Fellow, Academy of Finland / Adjunct Professor, University of Helsinki
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Tahko_smallTuomas E. Tahko is a Finnish Academy Research Fellow and Adjunct Professor at the University of Helsinki. He specializes in metaphysics and its methodology, is the editor of Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (CUP, 2012), and is currently writing the Cambridge Introduction to Metametaphysics. His recent articles include “Soames’s Deflationism About Modality” (Erkenntnis 78, no. 6, 2013), “Truth-Grounding and Transitivity” (Thought 2, no. 4, 2013), and “Boring Infinite Descent” (Metaphilosophy, forthcoming). More details at www.ttahko.net.

 

“Why We Are Probably Not Living in a Computer Simulation” by Preston Greene (17 Oct)

Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument shows that if we believe that civilizations like ours tend to eventually run many simulations of their past history, then we should be nearly certain that we are currently living in such a simulation. Bostrom discusses two reasons why civilizations like ours might not tend to run simulations—neither of which is fully compelling—i) that they tend to become extinct before acquiring the required technology, and ii) that they tend to decide against simulation because they find it morally reprehensible or uninteresting. In this paper, I develop a more compelling reason to think that advanced civilizations tend not to run simulations: viz., that deciding to create simulations of the sort required by the simulation argument is irrational (on the basis of self-interest), and the inhabitants of advanced civilizations are likely to be rational. Thus, reflection on rational decision making shows us that we are probably not living in a computer simulation. Even so, I end by warning that newly-designed experimental research aimed at determining whether our universe is a simulation is more dangerous than has been realized, and the scientific community should consider discontinuing it.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 17 Oct 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Preston Greene, Nanyang Technological University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Preston Greene is an assistant professor in the philosophy group at Nanyang Technological University. He completed his PhD at Rutgers University before coming to NTU in August. Before graduate school he was an actor, game show host, educational software developer, and intercollegiate soccer player at the University of California at Santa Cruz. His research concerns ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.

“Personal and Sub-Personal” by Hong Yu Wong (26 Sept)

It has been argued that personal level explanations are independent and autonomous from sub-personal level explanations (McDowell 1994, Hornsby 2000). These claims of autonomy have come under pressure from the recent explosion of results in cognitive neuroscience studying all aspects of human perception, action, and cognition. In this talk, I shall reconsider the relation between personal and sub-personal explanations in the light of advances in cognitive neuroscience and interventionist accounts of causation (Woodward 2003). On the way I will discuss the traditional distinction between constitutive and enabling conditions which has sometimes been used to mark the difference between personal and sub-personal explanations.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 26 Sept 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Hong Yu Wong, Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Hong Yu Wong heads the Philosophy of Neuroscience Group at the Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, an excellence cluster at the University of Tübingen. He is also a faculty member of the Philosophisches Seminar and the Max Planck Neural and Behavioural Graduate School at the University of Tübingen. His primary research interests concern the relations between perception and action, and the role of the body in structuring these relations.

“Passions and Punctilios: Models, Methods and Understanding in Physical Organic Chemistry” by Dr. Grant Fisher [1st Singapore Workshop on Integrated History and Philosophy of Science in Practice]

Public Talk: 1 Mar 2012, 2-4pm, AS7 Executive Seminar Room; Speaker: Dr. Grant Fisher, Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science and  Affiliate Professor in the Graduate School of Science and Technology Policy at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea.

Abstract:
In this talk I investigate the interplay of models and approximation methods amid scientific controversy in the recent history of physical organic chemistry. In the mid-1960’s, qualitative orbital symmetry models rationalised a number of previously unrelated organic reactions and provided crucial resources to predict their outcomes. The models and the quantitative approximations that were later able to reproduce the model predictions become a focus of controversies that raged in physical organic chemistry in the late twentieth century. These controversies were pitched both at the level of models and methods of approximation to fundamental physical theory. I argue that while qualitative orbital symmetry models were in dispute, they offered a unique perspective for the independent criticism of theoreticians’ approximation methods. Qualitative models were independent of any procedure of quantitative approximation and performed a “mediating” function by determining standards of approximation legitimacy. I use this case to probe some of the problems of model assessment within the models as mediators account. The case of orbital symmetry models seems to suggest a degree of scientific and meta-scientific convergence on the issue of understanding. I argue we should regard scientific understanding as a legitimate epistemic criterion for the assessment of models.

(Click on image to enlarge)

About the speaker: Grant Fisher is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science and an Affiliate Professor in the Graduate School of Science and Technology Policy at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea. His research interests include philosophy of scientific practice, models, history and philosophy of chemistry and socially relevant philosophy of science. He has worked at the Universities of Leeds, Durham, the Bosphorus University in Istanbul, and was a Research Fellow at University College London.

Explanation and gravity, by Lina Jansson (29 Sept 2011)

Philosophy Seminar Series: 29 Sept 2011, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Lina Jansson, Assistant Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, NTU; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:
Both Newton’s theory of gravity and the theory of general relativity are central examples of explanatory progress within the sciences.  In this talk I argue that both cases provide instances of explanation where a more complicated attitude than the standard accounts of explanation can easily accommodate is warranted.  Moreover, this problem affects any account with a specific kind of exclusivity about the relationships that can do explanatory work.  Here, I suggest that developing an account of explanation based on a notion of dependence allows us to better understand these central cases.

Photo on 12-09-2011 at 16.17 #2About the speaker: Lina Jansson is an assistant professor of philosophy at Nanyang Technological University.  She obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in 2011.  Before starting her Ph.D. she received a B.A. in physics and philosophy from Oxford University.
More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Gaining Access: Indirect Measurement in Planetary Astronomy and Geophysics, by Teru Miyake (8 Sept 2011)

Philosophy Seminar Series: 8 Sept 2011, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Teru Miyake, Assistant Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, NTU; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:
We have been astonishingly successful in gathering knowledge about certain objects or systems to which we seemingly have extremely limited access.   In light of this success, what are the methods through which we have come to have this knowledge, and what are the limits of what we can know using these methods?  Traditionally, philosophers have viewed the methods that scientists use in the investigation of limited-access systems as being hypothetico-deductive.  I argue that these methods are better understood by thinking of what scientists are doing as gaining access to the previously inaccessible parts of these systems through a series of indirect measurements.  We obtain a clearer picture both of what we can know with confidence about limited-access systems, and the limits of this knowledge.  I illustrate this way of thinking about the epistemology of limited-access systems through an examination of planetary astronomy and geophysics.

TMiyakeAbout the speaker: Teru has a BS in Applied Physics from the California Institute of Technology.  He worked as an engineer and then as a freelance translator specializing in science and technology before doing an MA in Philosophy at Tufts University.  He then went on to Stanford University, where he got his PhD in Philosophy.  His main area is in Philosophy of Science.
More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: No-Alternative Arguments, by Stephan Hartmann (12 April 2011)

Philosophy Seminar Series: 12 April 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Stephen Hartmann, Chair in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Director of the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, The Netherlands; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: We construct a Bayesian model to show that the observation that no one has yet found an alternative to a proposed hypothesis supports the hypothesis in question. Our model has various applications in epistemology and philosophy of science (such as the realism debate and IBE) which we also discuss. The talk is based on joint work with Richard Dawid (Vienna).

HartmannAbout the Speaker: Stephan Hartmann is Chair in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University and Director of the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science. He was formerly Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Director of LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. From 2002-2005, he directed the research group Philosophy, Probability and Modeling at the University of Konstanz. His primary research and teaching areas are general philosophy of science, formal epistemology, philosophy of physics, and political philosophy. Hartmann published numerous articles and the book Bayesian Epistemology (with Luc Bovens) that appeared in 2003 with Oxford University Press. His current research interests include formal social epistemology, modeling deliberation, the philosophy and psychology of reasoning, methodological questions regarding the use of mathematics and statistics in the social sciences, intertheoretic relations, and probabilities in physics.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Stephen Hartmann

Chair in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Director of the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science

Tilburg University, The Netherlands

Talk: The Precautionary Approach and the Role of Scientists in Environmental Decision-Making, by Jan Sprenger (18 Jan 2011)

Philosophy Seminar Series: 18 January 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Jan Sprenger, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Tilburg University; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: The role of scientists in environmental decision-making has recently been the subject of vivid discussion. It might be surmised that scientists have played their part in advising policy-makers as soon as they have assessed the amount of uncertainty, or established a particular hypothesis. Against this view, I argue that also in the genuine decision-makers process, scientists need to be included: environmental decision-making often has to follow a precautionary approach, and the exact decision-theoretic implications thereof are highly sensitive to the specific epistemic context we are in. Calibrating a decision rule with scope and nature of uncertainty in a decision problem is not possible without scientific understanding of the underlying environmental system. Therefore, scientists cannot and should not be restricted to purely epistemic tasks in environmental decision-making.

Please find two recent papers here and here.

IMG_1124About the speaker: Jan Sprenger (www.laeuferpaar.de) an is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University and Resident Fellow at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS). After completing a mathematics degree, he gained a Ph.D. in philosophy in 2008 at the University of Bonn, Germany. Jan works mostly in philosophy of science, in particular the foundations of statistical inference, formal epistemology and decision theory.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.