Absences, Many Absences and Causation

In this paper I offer a partial defense of absence causation in response to two related issues: (i) the problem of many absences, and (ii) Beebee’s claim that there is no metaphysically respectable, principled criterion that the friend of absence causation can appeal to in response to (i). I argue that holes provide a counterexample to Beebee’s claim, and I articulate the response to the many absences problem suggested by this case. In the final section I suggest ways this response can be developed to account for common-sense judgments about the causal relevance of other cases of absences.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Thursday, 17 November 2016
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Dr Phillip Meadows
Moderator: Dr Qu Hsueh Ming

About the Speaker:

Dr Phillip Meadows is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at UAE University, and have taught previously at Manchester, Keele and UWE, Bristol. His research covers topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of perception, having published on direct realism, spatial perception, audition, and holes. His present research project is to provide a coherent account of the nature of sound, silence and auditory perceptual experience.



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