On behalf of the NTU Philosophy Group, you are cordially invited to attend their philosophy seminar on Wednesday, 20 March, from 2.30pm to 4pm at the HSS Conference Room (HSS-05-57), HSS Building, NTU (for a map of the place, go to: http://maps.ntu.edu.sg/maps#q:HSS ).
If you are attending, please RSVP Priya at email@example.com
What is the relevant aspect of a conscious experience when it comes to classifying it? The philosophical debate is divided between those that consider that two conscious experiences are of the same kind if they are subjectively indistinguishable and those that deny such criterion. We will defend a view among the latter. Our central thesis is that the causal cognitive mechanism that underlies the realisation of the states that give place to a conscious experience is relevant when it comes to deciding what kind of experience it belongs to. Based on empirical evidence, we show that perceptions and hallucinations are originated by different cognitive mechanisms and, quite possibly, have distinct properties. Thus, it seems reasonable to claim that perceptions and hallucinations belong to different kinds or have a distinct psychological nature.
About the Speaker: Eduardo Garcia-Ramirez is a junior research fellow at IIFs-UNAM (Mexico). He is interested in the relevance of research from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics for debates in the philosophy of language, mind and epistemology. Part of his work has focused particularly on the theory of meaning and reference for proper anmes, as well as psychological accounts of empty names. For the past couple years he has been working on a translation of David Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds into Spanish.