Call “fictional assertions” sentences that look or sound like assertions, but which are produced as parts of fictions or in talk engaged with fictions. Two popular views about fictional assertions are either that they are genuinely assertions, but differ in content from the content they would have had if asserted literally; or that they are not assertions at all, but perhaps have some other force. In this paper, I will defend a view, similar to one suggested by Max Köbel, that fictional assertions have the same content as their literal counterparts and are genuinely asserted.
Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 7 June 2012
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 Level 5)
Speaker: Daniel Nolan, Professor of Philosophy, Australian National University
Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong
About the Speaker: Daniel Nolan is professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the author of two books, Topics in the Philosophy of Possible Worlds and David Lewis, and a number of articles. He works in a number of areas of philosophy, including philosophy of science, philosophy of language, meta-ethics and philosophical logic, though he works more in metaphysics than anything else.