Philosophy Seminar Series: 11Nov2010, 4-5pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Melvin Ng, Current Undergraduate, NUS; Moderator: Dr. Neil Sinhababu

Abstract: Stephen Darwall in his book The Second-Personal Standpoint develops the idea of second personal reasons as the basis for moral reasons. Second personal reasons are reasons that are grounded in the authority that free and rational agents have over one another. Furthermore, they are neither reducible to nor derivable from outcome- or value-regarding reasons. Darwall claims that we presuppose these reasons when we engage in second personal address, but acknowledges the possibility that they are merely chimerical. Part of his strategy to partially vindicate second personal reasons involves arguing that second personal reasons allow us to appreciate a fundamental difference between practical and theoretical reason, and thus develop a fuller understanding of our practical agency. I will aim to demonstrate that his vindicatory strategy fails by showing that his argument is really circular – he has smuggled in the premise that second personal reasons really do exist. I will then show what a full vindication of his metaethically loaded account of second personal reasons require, and suggest that second personal reasons cannot be fully vindicated.

About the Speaker: Melvin Ng is a current third year undergraduate at NUS. His main interest is in metaethics.