Author Archives: Nicholas Cai

“Skepticism and the Acquisition of ‘knowledge’ ” by Shaun Nichols (17 Jan)

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Do you know you’re not being massively deceived by an evil demon?  That’s a familiar skeptical challenge.  Less familiar is this question: How do you have a conception of knowledge on which the evil demon constitutes a prima facie challenge? Why do people – before training – respond so quickly to outlandish skeptical scenarios involving sorcerers and mad scientists?  We explore this question by taking a learning-theoretic approach.  We argue that, given the evidence available to the learner, it would be rational for the learner to infer an infallibilist conception of knowledge.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Friday, 17 Jan 2014
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Shaun Nichols, University of Arizona
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

nicholspictureShaun Nichols is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona, where he directs a research group on experimental philosophy. He has published widely at the intersection of philosophy and psychology, including a book on moral judgment, Sentimental Rules, as well as several articles in experimental philosophy on free will, responsibility, and cultural diversity.

“Conversational Implicature, Communicative Intentions, and Content” by Ray Buchanan (12 Dec)

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At the core of the Gricean account of conversational implicature is a certain assumption concerning the phenomenon that its proponents hope to explain, and predict; namely, that conversational implicatures are, essentially, cases of speaker meaning. Heck (2006), however, has argued that once we appreciate a distinctive kind of indeterminacy characteristic of many cases of particularized implicatures, we must reject this assumption. Heck’s observation is that there are cases where it is clear a speaker has conversationally implicated something by her utterance, but there is no particular proposition – other than what the speaker said – such that we can plausibly take the speaker to have meant, or intended to communicate, it. I argue that while Heck’s observation does call into question a standard assumption about the objects of our communicative intentions, it is ultimately not in conflict with the core Gricean idea. What is needed, I argue, is to give up the assumption, which has seemed to go hand-in hand with that idea: that propositions are both the things we mean as well as the objects of our cognitive attitudes. I sketch an alternative account of the things we mean – one that that allows for the fact that in many cases of successful communicative exchanges, speakers do not intend to communicate any particular proposition.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 12 Dec 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Ray Buchanan, University of Texas, Austin
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Since receiving his PhD from New York University in 2008, Ray Buchanan has been an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin. His work primarily focuses on the questions of how, and to what extent, we can express our thoughts by our actions – linguistic, or otherwise. Ray has published papers on these issues in Mind, Nous, Philosopher’s Imprint, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Thought, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, and elsewhere. His more recent work focuses on the nature of linguistic agency and foundational issues in pragmatics.

“Aristotle on the ease of Philosophy” by Matthew Walker (5 Dec)

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Aristotle’s Protrepticus, which currently exists only in fragments, was a popular work that sought to exhort its audience to pursue a philosophical life. As part of its task, the Protrepticus attempts to respond to the worry that philosophical contemplation is somehow too demanding or difficult to be pursued or enjoyed with profit. On the contrary, Aristotle argues, philosophy is actually easy. I aim (i) to understand what these arguments are saying and (ii) to evaluate these arguments in the light of objections that they naturally elicit. I contend that these arguments offer reasonable responses to worries about philosophy’s demandingness.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 5 Dec 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Matthew D. Walker (Ph.D. Yale) is Assistant Professor of Humanities (Philosophy) at Yale-NUS College. Before starting at Yale-NUS, he was an ACLS New Faculty Fellow at Rutgers University. His papers have been published, or are forthcoming, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Apeiron, Ancient Philosophy, and other venues.

“The Varieties of Envy” by Sara Protasi (28 Nov)

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Psychologists define envy as an aversive reaction to a perceived inferiority, which we feel toward those who are similar to us, with respect to a good or goal pertaining to a domain that is relevant to our sense of identity. This definition, however, applies to at least two different emotions, with opposite moral valences: malicious envy and benign envy. Scholars have provided different accounts of the distinction. Psychologists believe the crucial factor is whether the envier feels capable to overcome her disadvantage. Philosophers suggest that what differs is the subject’s focus of attention, that is, on whether one is focused on lacking the good or on the fact that someone else, the envied, has it. In my paper I show that both variables are at play, and that they do not co-vary but are independent. Consequently, we can experience not just two but four kinds of envy, with varying degree of maliciousness: emulative envy, inert envy, aggressive envy, and spiteful envy. Developing a more precise and adequate knowledge of envy’s anatomy allows the moralist to come up with the right diagnosis and remedies for what has been considered the worst of the deadly sins.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 28 Nov 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Sara Protasi, Yale University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Sara Protasi is a PhD candidate in philosophy at Yale University. She is working on the philosophical psychology, moral dimensions, and ancient and modern accounts of envy. Her previous work is on the normative dimensions of romantic love. She is also interested in feminist philosophy, bioethics, and philosophy of dance.

“The Diamond Sutra as Sublime Object: Negation, Narration, and Happy Endings” by Alan Cole (21 Nov)

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This paper close reads an early Mahayana text, the so-called “Diamond Sutra” (Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita), to argue that the meaning of the work is best found on the level of narrative.  That is, on closer examination, the text doesn’t appear to be a random set of philosophic claims about reality, value, language, and meaning; instead, it can be shown that the text is structured – particularly in the first half — to provide a fairly well-controlled reading-experience in which the reader is led through various claims about Buddhist truths and values, claims that, while strikingly contradictory in places, can actually be seen working together to further the narrative’s larger goal of seducing the reader into worshipping the text itself as a buddha-like entity that supposedly holds the essence of the Buddhist tradition.  Thus amidst wild-sounding negations that declare that there is no truth or teachings in Buddhism, we find several passages where the Buddha-in-the-text speaks about the text he is currently giving, explaining that it provides the most exalted teachings and unlimited value, while also claiming that its sheer presence should be taken as a stand-in for the Buddha and his relics.  In short, the text first generates an image of a live Buddha appearing to go about his business on an ordinary day, and yet once this Buddha-in-the-text is established, he turns to give a teaching that, via negation, redefinition and wild value-claims, presents the reader with the stunning claim that he is holding the best thing in the universe.

Puzzling through these various paradoxes and working to understand how the author managed such a happy-ending in the context of all these radical-sounding negations is the point of the paper.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 21 Nov 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Alan Cole, Lewis and Clark College
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Alan Cole took his Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies at the University of Michigan, in 1994.  Since then he has taught at a number of American colleges and universities, with most of those twenty years spent at Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon.  His recently published books – Text as Father: Paternal Seductions in Early Mahayana Buddhist Literature (UCal Press, 2005) and Fathering Your Father: The Zen of Fabrication in Tang Buddhism (2009, UCal Press) — are concerned with understanding how narratives function within important Buddhist texts in India and China.  As these titles suggest, he has been working to develop a theory about how Buddhist authors knowingly constructed their works and naturally this involves worrying about how intersubjectivity functions in these artful literary gambits.  More recently, he has tried to extend these theoretical perspectives in a comparative work titled, “Fetishizing Tradition: Desire and Reinvention in Buddhist and Christian Narratives.”  (The book is currently under review at SUNY Press.)  He is currently working on another book, Patriarchs on Paper: A Critical History of Chan (Zen) Literature from 600-1200, (currently under review at UCal Press).

“On the Selection of Good Leaders in a Political Meritocracy” by Daniel Bell (24 Oct)

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In this talk, I will assume that (1) it is good for a political community to be governed by high-quality rulers; (2) China’s one party political system is not about to collapse; (3) the meritocratic aspect of the system is partly good; and (4) it can be improved. On the basis of these assumptions, I will put forward suggestions about which qualities matter most for political leaders in the context of large, peaceful, and modernizing (non-democratic) meritocratic states, followed by suggestions about mechanisms that increase the likelihood of selecting leaders with such qualities. I will use the philosophical theory about the best possible political meritocracy in the context of a large, peaceful, and modernizing state as a standard for evaluating China’s actually-existing meritocratic system. I will argue that China can and should improve its meritocratic system: it needs exams that more effectively test for politically relevant intellectual abilities, more women in leadership positions to increase the likelihood that leaders have the social skills required of effective policy-making, and more systematic use of a peer review system to promote political officials motivated by the desire to serve the public.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 24 Oct 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Daniel A. Bell, Center for International and Comparative Political Theory, Tsinghua University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Daniel A. Bell is Visiting Professor, Depts of Philosophy and Political Science, NUS. He is Professor of Ethics and Political Theory, and Director of the Center for International and Comparative Political Theory, Tsinghua University (Beijing). He taught at NUS from 1991-94. He has authored and edited 15 books, of which the latest (coedited with Li Chenyang) is The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2013). He is currently writing a book on political meritocracy. He is a regular contributor to leading media outlets in China and the West and his works have been translated into 23 languages.

“Why We Are Probably Not Living in a Computer Simulation” by Preston Greene (17 Oct)

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Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument shows that if we believe that civilizations like ours tend to eventually run many simulations of their past history, then we should be nearly certain that we are currently living in such a simulation. Bostrom discusses two reasons why civilizations like ours might not tend to run simulations—neither of which is fully compelling—i) that they tend to become extinct before acquiring the required technology, and ii) that they tend to decide against simulation because they find it morally reprehensible or uninteresting. In this paper, I develop a more compelling reason to think that advanced civilizations tend not to run simulations: viz., that deciding to create simulations of the sort required by the simulation argument is irrational (on the basis of self-interest), and the inhabitants of advanced civilizations are likely to be rational. Thus, reflection on rational decision making shows us that we are probably not living in a computer simulation. Even so, I end by warning that newly-designed experimental research aimed at determining whether our universe is a simulation is more dangerous than has been realized, and the scientific community should consider discontinuing it.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 17 Oct 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Preston Greene, Nanyang Technological University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Preston Greene is an assistant professor in the philosophy group at Nanyang Technological University. He completed his PhD at Rutgers University before coming to NTU in August. Before graduate school he was an actor, game show host, educational software developer, and intercollegiate soccer player at the University of California at Santa Cruz. His research concerns ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.

“What Is Choice Sensitivity? A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarianism” by Micha Glaeser (10 Oct)

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Luck egalitarians hold that inequalities between individuals are unjust when they are the result of differences in unchosen circumstances but not when they reflect differences in the choices made by those individuals. A just distribution is one that is both luck insensitive and choice sensitive. In this paper I argue that the idea of choice sensitivity is ambiguous between two different interpretations, both of which are problematic. The first interpretation renders luck egalitarianism intuitively implausible. The second interpretation threatens to undercut the fundamental moral significance of choice on which the luck-egalitarian project turns. I then suggest a reinterpretation of the significance of choice, one that both renders luck egalitarianism intuitively attractive and preserves choice as a fundamental justificatory consideration.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 10 Oct 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Micha Glaeser, Harvard University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Micha Glaeser is a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at Harvard University. As an undergraduate he studied at the University of Bayreuth, Germany, and the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests are in moral, political, and legal philosophy. In his dissertation he defends an account of the relation between law and morality that transcends the positivist-natural law dichotomy. He currently resides in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for reasons of love.

“Unapologetically Insane Tales” by Zed Yeo

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Ben, an Alumnus of the Philosophy department, has written a book of short stories over a span of 6 years. In a recent interview, he mentions that philosophy – ontology, epistemology, existentialism, morality – inspired his stories. Ben’s book is up on indiegogo, do support him by contributing to his project (open till the 26th of September), and by sharing this with your friends! You can also read excerpts of his charming book by following the link.

“Personal and Sub-Personal” by Hong Yu Wong (26 Sept)

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It has been argued that personal level explanations are independent and autonomous from sub-personal level explanations (McDowell 1994, Hornsby 2000). These claims of autonomy have come under pressure from the recent explosion of results in cognitive neuroscience studying all aspects of human perception, action, and cognition. In this talk, I shall reconsider the relation between personal and sub-personal explanations in the light of advances in cognitive neuroscience and interventionist accounts of causation (Woodward 2003). On the way I will discuss the traditional distinction between constitutive and enabling conditions which has sometimes been used to mark the difference between personal and sub-personal explanations.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Thursday, 26 Sept 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Hong Yu Wong, Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Hong Yu Wong heads the Philosophy of Neuroscience Group at the Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, an excellence cluster at the University of Tübingen. He is also a faculty member of the Philosophisches Seminar and the Max Planck Neural and Behavioural Graduate School at the University of Tübingen. His primary research interests concern the relations between perception and action, and the role of the body in structuring these relations.