On Self-Deception: Contradictory and Spectral Beliefs

Abstract:
It is argued that self-deception can be modeled on interpersonal deception. However, attempting to explain self-deception in terms of interpersonal deception implies that the deception specific to interpersonal deception is similar, and therefore comparable, to that of self-deception. The ineffectiveness of explaining the latter in terms of the former becomes evident when the respective roles of the deceiver and deceived in interpersonal deception fail to consistently cohere with the self-deceiving individual’s responsibility to hold both roles. On the grounds that the two types of deception are dissimilar and therefore cannot be explained in terms of one another, an alternative theory of self-deception is introduced, one that escapes the inconsistencies faced by the majority of theories modeled on interpersonal deception. This theory argues that self-deception occurs in two fundamental forms: transitional self-deception, where the self-deceiver undergoes a transition of beliefs from one to another, and resistance self-deception, where the self-deceiver consciously avoids coming to terms with the truth of the new belief.

Date: 4 April 2017
Time: 2pm to 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room (AS3-05-23)

About the Speaker:
Jane holds a B.A. (Hons) in Philosophy and History from Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Her main areas of interest include epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and Kant’s conditions for knowledge. Her honors thesis proposes an alternative theory of self-deception, which escapes both the static and dynamic paradoxes posed by the traditional view common within the self-deception literature. During her free time, she enjoys reading, ballet, and traveling.

                                                                                                                                                                                                            All are welcome