Given its resistance to positive metaphysical assertions, contemporary interpretations of Madhyamaka are prone to casting the enterprise as sceptical. This tendency has given rise to comparative work in which Hume and foremost Madhyamaka figures such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are placed in the same ‘sceptical family’ owing to the commonalities in their sceptical approaches and outcomes. While it is evident that there are ostensible thematic similarities that obtain between Humean scepticism and certain elements present in Madhyamaka, I contend that it is problematic, or at least ill-advised, to characterize Madhyamaka itself as a sceptical enterprise.

This is due primarily to the following: firstly, that there are reliable means of knowledge (pramāṇa) which are both acknowledged and legitimated in the Madhyamaka corpus, which run counter to Hume’s genealogical-sceptical assertions; and secondly, the fact that a Madhyamaka adherent simply does not have the doxastic luxury of exercising Humean scepticism given his or her soteriological commitments. Consequently, the task of tracing a common sceptical filament that runs through Hume and Nāgārjuna or Candrakīrti, should be jettisoned. It is hoped that the ground-clearing task with regards to Madhyamaka vis-à-vis scepticism, will also generate insights regarding Hume’s sceptical project; in particular, the tension and possible reconciliation of both its negative and constructive phases.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 5 Apr 2016
Time: 3.30 pm – 5 pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: David Premsharan
Moderator: Jeremy Huang

About the Speaker:

David is currently pursuing his M.A. in Philosophy at NUS, where he works primarily in Buddhist epistemology, and engages in comparative work involving Madhyamaka thought. His research interests include Indian philosophical traditions more generally, methodological concerns in comparative philosophy, and extend to critical and postcolonial inquiry.