According to deontological approaches to justification, we can analyze justification in deontic terms. In this paper, I try to advance the discussion of deontological approaches by applying recent insights in the semantics of deontic modals. Specifically, I use the distinction between weak necessity modals (“ought”, “should”) and strong necessity modals (“must”, “have to”) to develop and defend a new version of the deontological approach. According to the view I defend, “justified” expresses a deontic status that I call “faultlessness”, which is defined as the dual of weak necessity modals. After unpacking this status, I explain how the Faultlessness View avoids the problems facing rival deontological theories.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Thursday, 11 February 2016
Time: 3pm – 5pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Bob Beddor
Moderator: Prof Neiladri Sinhababu

About the Speaker:

Bob Beddor is a PhD candidate at Rutgers University. Most of his work is in epistemology, with close connections to philosophy of language and metaethics.