In this talk, I propose a new semantic framework for reasoning about a notion of content that inherits two important features of the Fregean notion of sense. First, it inherits the hyperintensional structure of Fregean senses. Senses are hyperintensional because some necessarily equivalent sentences have distinct senses. Second, it inherits the non-trivial structure of Fregean senses. Senses are non-trivial because some necessarily equivalent sentences have the same sense. So, while cut very finely, sense it is not an “everything goes” view on content: there are non-trivial constraints on how finely individuated Fregean senses should be. By developing a semantics in which we can capture such Fregean-inspired distinctions among contents, I argue that we can develop a semantics for a non-trivial, hyperintensional notion of content. A core feature of the semantics is that it can represent a whole spectrum of notions of content: ranging from extremely fine-grained content—and potentially trivial content—to content that is individuated up to logical equivalence. The resulting semantic flexibility, I argue, is desirable when it comes to accounting for hyperintensional content.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Thursday, 14 January 2016
Time: 3pm – 5pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Jens Christian Bjerring, Aarhus University
Moderator: A/P Neiladri Sinhababu

About the Speaker:

Dr. Bjerring was awarded the PhD degree in philosophy from the Australian National University in November 2010. Currently, he is lecturing at Aarhus University (Denmark). He is particularly interested in issues in epistemology, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and mind.