Gilbert Harman argues that logic as a science of consequence relations (what he calls ‘implications’) is not the same thing as reasoning in the sense of a procedure for ‘rea- soned change in view’. Harman’s position is an orthodox position among contemporary philosophers and logicians. In fact, Harman takes himself to be explicating what every- one already believes rather than arguing for his position. In this paper, I will demonstrate two things. First, I will show that a paraconsistent logician (someone who rejects ex con- tradictione quodlibet (ECQ) (ϕ, ¬ϕ |= ψ for any ϕ, ψ) as invalid) should reject Harman’s position. Second, based on my analysis of paraconsistent logic, I will argue against Har- man’s position. If it is true that Harman’s position represents a modern orthodoxy, its rejection has a number of consequences. I will briefly discuss some of them in the end.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Thursday, 12 Nov 2015
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Koji Tanaka, Lecturer, School of Philosophy, Australian National University
Moderator: Dr Qu Hsueh Ming

About the Speaker:

Koji Tanaka is Lecturer in the School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University. He works on logic, the philosophy of logic, Buddhist philosophy and Chinese philosophy. His current project is to integrate Buddhist insights into the nature of logic with contemporary debates about logic and to challenge the foundations of the (Western) contemporary development of logic.