My review article in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies offers a critical analysis of Horst Eidenmüller and Gerhard Wagner’s Law by Algorithm by focusing on four major sets of issues that are covered in this important work: (i) separate legal personality for artificial intelligence (AI) systems; (ii) the exploitation and protection of consumers; (iii) liability; and (iv) online dispute resolution.
Private lawyers often talk about interpersonal justice in a way that presumes some level of consensus ad idem over the concept. This, however, can be doubted.
Private law is often said to be distinctive in a certain sense: it is about ‘interpersonal justice’. But consider the following: Antony Duff says criminal law is to be understood in a certain relational way. Kristen Rundle says that the Fullerian ideal of the internal morality of law concerns certain relations between the lawgiver and law subject. Avihay Dorfman argues that there are relational aspects of many public law duties. If there is any meaningful use of the relational architecture in these domains, it must extend beyond the vision offered by what is traditionally known as the ‘bipolarity’ thesis in private law.