Monthly Archives: April 2024

Paratexts and Authorship

The materiality of literature, and its implications on copyright law’s central categories of author and work, is a recurrent question in the theory and history of intellectual property. In my recent article ‘From Paratexts to Print Machinery’ published in Law and Critique, I attend to some peripheral matters of Immanuel Kant’s 1785 essay, ‘On the Wrongfulness of Reprinting’ (Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks), as indices of its medial-material conditions of possibility. This medial reading is guided by Gérard Genette’s notion of the paratext, defined as ‘what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its readers and, more generally, to the public.’ Originally appearing in the May 1785 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift, Kant’s publication materially encompassed not only the epitextual background of the German Enlightenment, but also the peritextual features of catchwords, signature marks, and various front matter. I argue that the periodical was deeply involved in the operations of a print machinery preceding the authorial figure, the existence of which perturbs copyright law’s attachment to original authorship.

The Nature of Property in Cryptoassets

While cryptoassets have generally been accepted as a form of property in Commonwealth jurisdictions, it remains unclear how specific property rules apply. What is required for title to a cryptoasset to be legally transferred? Is a blockchain transaction necessary or sufficient for that purpose? If a transaction is unauthorised or procured by fraud, when (if ever) do subsequent purchasers take free of the original owner’s title? These questions are relevant, for example, to proprietary disputes in crypto litigation and the structuring of secured crypto-finance arrangements.

Justifying Concurrent Claims in Private International Law

Should claimants be entitled to sue either in contract or tort (or both sans double recovery) on a single set of facts? In domestic law, the answer to this question – the question of concurrent liability – matters because obvious differences exist between contract and tort: different remoteness, remedial, and limitation rules apply, for example. Choosing between these claims allows claimants to maximise the chances and consequences of success. Is this justifiable?