Category Archives: Criminal Law

Should Swearing be Punished by the Criminal Law?

Australians have a reputation for laidback attitudes towards swearing. But did you know that across Australia, it is a crime to use offensive language in or near a public place?

Much of my research considers the relationship between language, power and the criminal law. In my recent article, ‘It might be powerful; but is it offensive? Unpacking judicial views on the c-word’, I consider the legal treatment of a common Australian swear word: ‘c___t’. My article asks two questions: Have societal attitudes towards this word changed in Australia? And if they have, how should its use be judged by the criminal law?

Sentencing Offenders for Driving Dangerously or Carelessly While Under Influence: Resolving the Double-counting Quandary

The Singapore legislature introduced a set of refined and interlinked provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1961 (RTA), which came into force on 1 November 2019. These provisions were intended to deal better with cases in Singapore where motorists drove dangerously or carelessly while under influence of drink or drugs. However, these provisions when applied may give rise to an issue of double-counting in punishment, and the way in which the courts have applied these provisions is such that in some cases this double-counting is fully ameliorated while in other cases it is not.

Consent in Modern Criminal Law

Our Festschrift essay, published in the Victoria University of Wellington Law Review to honour Professor ATH Smith, addresses the current law and practice in England and Wales and in New Zealand relating to findings of consent or non-consent by P to interactions between D and P. Publication constraints required confining attention to interactions between competent adults. Neither could we discuss which activities are permissible on a menu of choices that any competent adult might make. Contested and divisive issues relating to radical choices such as the consensual infliction of serious bodily harm or ministering death to the terminally ill are not considered. Rather, our concern is with interactions between D and P, in circumstances where what D does is uncontestably lawful if done with P’s consent, yet otherwise unlawful. The cases and statutory rules discussed relate predominantly to criminal law but there is also discussion of the civil law of consent, especially in the context of crimes relating to financial and propriety wrongs.