Monthly Archives: March 2024

Liability for Environmental Harm to the Global Commons

On 10 November 1988, the oil tanker Odyssey broke apart in the North Atlantic 700 miles off the Canadian coast. With 132,000 tons of crude oil released into the marine environment, it was one of the largest oil spills to have ever occurred. However, because it occurred in the high seas and did not reach the shores of any state, no response actions were taken, even though marine environmental harm almost certainly occurred. The pollution did not trigger the same sort of response as an oil spill in maritime areas under sovereignty (such as territorial waters) or under national jurisdiction (such as Exclusive Economic Zones) because the harm itself was to the environment per se as opposed to impacting the economic interests of a particular state or private actor. Even if the consequent environmental harm was quantifiable and compensable, it is not clear what legal entities would have the right to recover for the loss suffered. This is a function of the nature of the high seas as a “global commons” area or an area beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), where no state has jurisdiction and where harm is suffered by all states and arguably by all humankind, given the interconnected nature of the oceans and the variety of ecosystem services it provides.

Corporate Governance in Singapore – The Road Thus Far

The first Code of Corporate Governance was adopted in Singapore 21 years ago in 2001. Since then, the Code has been re-issued three times, the last being in 2018. There has also been a shift in approach taken by the Singapore regulators with regards to how corporate governance should be enforced among companies, especially those listed on the Singapore Exchange. From a voluntary “comply-or-explain” approach to partially mandatory, instilling the right degree of corporate governance in Singapore companies has been a balancing act for the regulators throughout these years.

Schrödinger’s Lawful Act Duress: Dead or Alive?

Can you set aside a contract if you were induced to enter it by my application of lawful pressure that may threaten your economic interests, reputation, or your concern to protect a loved one? This raises difficult policies since the only viable basis for discriminating between acceptable and unacceptable pressures is not positive law but social morality. On the other hand, if lawful pressures are always exempt, those who devise outrageous but technically lawful means of compulsion must always escape. The courts have accepted that the categories of duress are not closed and that an illegitimate threat can include one which is lawful, although it must ‘at least be immoral or unconscionable’. What then falls within this category of lawful act duress?