[An update added 08102015] [An update to the earlier update added 09102015]

On Readings, p. 305, the objector is made to ask why, since (according to Xunzi), Sageliness is achieved through accumulation, not everyone can accumulate in this way and so acquire Sageliness? We can formulate the objection as follows:

(1) Everyone has the same nature.

(2) Everyone could become a (superlatively) virtuous agent. (From (1))

(3) Some people are virtuous agent, other people are not (some are vicious agents).

The objector is now asking: if (2) follows from (1)—as explained in the previous post—how is it that (3)? Why does everyone not become virtuous agents, let alone superlatively virtuous agents?

Xunzi gave a rather involved reply that required him to make several distinctions. The first thing he said was:

They could do it, but they cannot be made to do it. Thus, the petty man could (kěyǐ 可以) become a gentleman, but is not willing (bùkěn 不肯) to become a gentleman. The gentleman could become a petty man, but is not willing to become a petty man. It has never been that the petty man and gentleman are incapable of becoming each other. However, the reason they do not become each other is that while they could do so, they cannot be made to do so.

Two slightly different points seem to be made here. First,

(4) Some people are willing to do the things that would have allowed them to become a virtuous agent, others are unwilling.

Two quick comments: First, for simplicity’s sake, I’m taking “cannot be made to” as being equivalent to “is unwilling to”. Second, Xunzi has already spelt out what those things the doing of which would have allowed people to become virtuous agents previously (Readings, p. 305 top; see also the last part of the previous post). Anyway, the point now is that with (4), there isn’t a tension between (1)/(2) and (3) after all, since even though two persons have the same nature—and so both can become virtuous—one might be willing while the other unwilling, to do things that would have allowed either to become a virtuous agent.

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On p. 303 of Readings, Xunzi considers the Confucian slogan (cf. Mencius 4B32, 6B2) “Anyone on the streets could become a Yu”, i.e., everyone can become a sage, a superlatively virtuous agent. At one level, the slogan does not pose a problem for Xunzi—he has already insisted that everyone has the same nature, therefore, if anyone could become virtuous, all could. But spelling this out properly is tricky since Xunzi needs his account not to imply that virtue is part of nature and that’s why all can become virtuous agents. He begins by way of something definitional:

(1) A (superlatively) virtuous agent is what he is because he exemplifies the various dimensions of virtue (“benevolence, righteousness, lawfulness, and correctness”).

We will also need to keep in mind other assumptions that are unstated in the text here, but needed for his argument to work:

(2) (Superlatively) virtuous agents exist.

(3) Everyone have the same nature.

Since actuality implies possibility, Xunzi draws two conclusions from the above:

(4) The various dimensions of virtue have patterns that are knowable and practicable. (From (1), (2))

(5) Even the man on the street as the material for knowing, and the equipment for practicing, the various dimensions of virtue.* (From (1)-(4)).

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On p. 303 of Readings, Xunzi considers the following objection: “Ritual and the standards of righteousness and the accumulation of deliberate effort are people’s nature, and that is why the sage is able to produce them.” It’s probably not right to think of Mencius as the main target in this section (considering that Mencius is not named, and Xunzi was not shy in naming Mencius as the opponent in other sections of the chapter). Rather, the opponent may be thought of as someone who thinks that there is good nature, and there is bad nature.

But let me first rephrase the objection as follows:

(1) A person comes to be a virtuous agent by his (accumulated) deliberate effort.

(2) The best explanation for how (1) is possible is that virtue is already part of his nature.

(3) Virtue is part of at least some people’s nature. (From (1), (2))

Xunzi’s reply is an argument by analogy, attacking (2):

(4) Clay comes to be tiles by the potter’s deliberate effort (shaping); wood comes to be utensils by the craftsman’s deliberate effort (carving)

(5) Neither the material (clay, wood), nor the final form (tiles, utensils), of the products are part of the potter or craftsman’s nature.

(6) The best explanation of (4) can’t be that either the material (clay, wood), or the final form (tiles, utensils), of the products are part of the potter or craftsman’s nature. (From (4) and (5))

(7) The best explanation for how (1) is possible is not that virtue is already part of our nature. (From (6) by analogy, showing that (2) is false)

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