(This is in response to In Hae’s questions and observations, posted previously.)

Human nature and Equality

Before proceeding, it is important to get clear on Mencius’ stance on equality–both the factual issue of whether and in what sense people are equal, and the normative issue of whether and in what sense people should be equal (e.g., have equal status, be treated equally). Now, at the factual level, Mencius does think that all human beings have the four sprouts of virtue (2A6, 6A6), that all human beings–sages and normal people alike–have the same preferences of the heart (xin) in common (6A7). In a nutshell, we all have the same nature (xing) that Mencius calls good–because it is a deep fact about all of us that we can become good. In short:

(1) All humans are equal in having the potential to become good

But does Mencius also think that human beings are equally good? Think of 6A7 again–there is still a difference between the sage and I–between those whose expertise on our common preferences exceeds the rest of us. The Yi Ya, Shi Kuang and Zidu of ethical conduct. Nor does Mencius give any indication that at any point in time, all are equally morally accomplished.

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(In Hae emailed on the issue of Mencius’ social-political ideal. Her email is reproduced below, slightly edited and rearranged. It’s a good set of questions and observations, and worth our time thinking through. As there is quite a bit that can be said in response, I will post my reply in a subsequent post later today.)

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What is the ‘ideal’ society that Mencius envisions, and will there be social mobility in that society? This question is inspired by 1A7, 6A15 and 1B6.

In 1A7, Mencius says:

To lack a constant livelihood, yet to have a constant heart-only a scholar is capable of this. As for the people, if they lack a constant livelihood, it follows that they will lack a constant heart.

There is a clear contrast between “a scholar” and “the people” here, but I doubt if this is meant as a difference between two different social classes. After all, anyone has the capacity to become great humans (6A15), so if a scholar is someone capable of having a constant heart (=great humans), anyone can in turn become a scholar, right?

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In Hae asked about Mencius 4B29 (read the passage in Readings 141 or what follows may not make sense to you), specifically, about how the third paragraph relates to the first two. In the first two paragraphs, Mencius speaks of Yu and Hou Ji (two ancient sages), and Yan Hui (Confucius’ favorite disciple–I trust you remember). In the third, he speaks of some hypothetical situations (“Now suppose…”). So what is going on?

The point of the first paragraph is roughly that: while Yu and Hou Ji lived in a peaceful era (during the time of Sage Shun’s rule), and Yan Hui lived in a chaotic time, they were all judged by Confucius to be worthy people–even though they did rather different things. Yu and Hou Ji were busy with government while Yan Hui lived in poverty and obscurity. The implied thought is that difference between their conduct is really a function of the fact that the former two lived in a peaceful era while Yan Hui lived in a chaotic era. In other words, the right thing to do will depend on circumstances; equally worthy people can end up doing very different but equally proper things because of the circumstances they find themselves in. Conversely, as the second paragraph emphasized, the three–being all worthy people–would have done as the others if they have switched places.

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This is regarding the story about Mencius and his mother that I briefly mentioned in class. You can read them in the an appendix in D. C. Lau’s edition of the Mencius. There were actually several stories from later tradition about Mencius and the women in his life, i.e., his mom and his wife, including some from the Lienüzhuan (列女傳; roughly “Traditions of Exemplary Women”; ca. 1st Century BC). (There is an excellent electronic resource about this fascinating text here; see a drawing of Mencius and his mother, and her loom here.)

I’ll post two of the stories about Mrs. Meng and the boy Mencius (D. C. Lau trans.) below:

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(Originally written as replies to a student’s questions by email. I’ve rearranged them a bit and reposed the questions myself.)

Q: What does the qi in 2A2 and the “fine patterns” of 6A7 mean?

If you are using Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, there is a useful glossary entry for qi 气 on p. 391. Briefly, for the early thinkers (including Mencius), qi refers to the vital humor, breath or life force found in a human body, and associated with the emotions. (This connection is preserved in modern Chinese, where getting angry is literally to have ‘rising qi‘.) The term translated “fine patterns” (li 理) in 6A7 is, unfortunately, not in the glossary. Think of it as order (could be an aesthetically pleasing or ethically attractive sort of order).

In later thought, qi came to refer to the stuff of which everything in the universe (both physical and psychical) is composed of, while li came to refer to the underlying structure, reason, principle of things in the universe. On this way of thinking, everything in the universe is a composite of li and qi (hence it is sometimes called li-qi metaphysics).

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