“A Critique of the use of public political culture in Rawls’ Political Liberalism” by Li Qingyi (8 Apr)

John Rawls argues in Political Liberalism that a conception of justice has to be freestanding, and theorizing ought to begin from the public political culture of a democratic society: a shared fund of fundamental ideas that is implicitly affirmed by the citizens in a democratic state. Conceptions of justice based on one comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine will be oppressive to people who do not share that particular comprehensive doctrine.

In this presentation, I will offer criticisms against Rawls’s use of the public political culture in his theory. I argue that (i) Rawls is unable to offer any justification for liberalism in states that needs liberalism most, (ii) Rawls makes problematic assumptions about the fundamental ideas of a democratic society, and (iii) Rawls’s liberal prescriptions are already assumed when the fundamental ideas are drawn from a democratic society. The success of my arguments will pave the way for the possibility of establishing moral foundations for public reason liberalism.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 8 Apr 2014
Time: 2 pm – 3 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Li Qingyi
Moderator: Melvin Ng

About the Speaker:

croppedQingyi is working towards his M.A. in Philosophy and his area of interest is in political philosophy. His dissertation project examines the moral foundations of political philosophy, more specifically liberal neutrality. Other topics of interest in political philosophy include: liberal theory, methodological concerns in political philosophy, distributive justice and global justice. His interests also extend to moral philosophy.

“A Proposal for the European Voters” by Elena Ziliotti (1 Apr)

In May, the citizens across the 28 European countries will elect their new 751 representatives at the European Parliament. What the Europeans will decide in May and in the near future is more than ever crucial for the Continent. Europe indeed needs to solve difficult issues, such as a stagnant GDP, high youth unemployment, together with diverging economic trajectories among the member states. The thorny situation can be solved only by specific, efficient and tough decisions, but are the European voters ready to do their duty? A recent survey casts doubt on the competence of the European voter.

Following, the recent commentary in WordPost, “Should Voters be tested?”, co-written with Prof. Daniel Bell, I propose to introduce a multiple choice test in order to improve the political knowledge of the European voters. I then i) defend our proposal from two objections, the “Communitarian argument” and the “Egalitarian argument”, and ii) explain some of the advantages of the test over two alternative solutions.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 1 Apr 2014
Time: 3 pm – 4 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Elena Ziliotti
Moderator: Jane Loo

About the Speaker:

IMG_0878Elena is a PhD student in the Join Program between NUS and King’s College London. Elena holds an M.A. in Analytic Philosophy from University of Barcelona UB (Spain) and an M.A. in Philosophy from University of Parma (Italy). As an undergraduate, she studied philosophy at the University of Parma and was a visiting student at the Radboud University in Nijmegen (Netherlands). Elena’s main area of research is Political Philosophy. Her PhD dissertation will focus on Political Meritocracy, investigating the relation among this form of governance and the main strains of thought in Western political philosophy.

“Is “Modern Confucianism” an Oxymoron?: Liang Shuming’s Attempt at Resolving the Tension between the Modern and Confucian Conceptions of Time during the New Culture Movement” by Philippe Major (1 Apr)

Confucianism can be seen as a tradition which is essentially nostalgic. To the socio-political instability of the Spring and Autumn period (春秋時代, 771-476 BC) at the end of which he lived, Confucius’ (孔子, 551-479 BC) response was to promote a return to the ways of the Zhou (周朝, 1046-771 BC). This, the gentleman-scholar had to achieve by studying and embodying the rites of the Zhou. Modernity, on the other hand, betrays a forward-looking mentality. Emancipation being posited as the telos of history, the modern individual must strive towards this goal by breaking free of the shackles of tradition.

How did modern Confucianism attempt at resolving the tension between the Confucian and modern conceptions of time? In this presentation, I will discuss Liang Shuming’s (梁漱溟, 1893-1988) work Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies (東西文化及其哲學, 1921), which is often seen as the first work of philosophy produced by Modern Confucianism, and which I see as China’s first attempt at resolving the tension between the modern and Confucian conceptions of time emerging during the New Culture Movement (新文化運動, 1915-1927).

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 1 Apr 2014
Time: 2 pm – 3 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Philippe Major
Moderator: Nicholas Cai

About the Speaker:

PhilippeCROPPhilippe is a PhD student in the Philosophy department of the National University of Singapore. He holds a Master’s degree in History from National Taiwan University. His Master’s thesis consisted of a study of the consciousness of time of New Culture Movement (1915-1927) intellectuals such as Liang Shuming and Chen Duxiu, as well as the redefinition of modernity which was inherent in their views of time. His PhD dissertation will focus on how modern Confucian thinkers, whom inherited a tradition rooted in the idea that individual development is informed by, and achieved through, a given socio-historical context, reacted to a modern definition of the self which is to a great extent atomistic, being alienated from both community and tradition.

“A Relativistic Argument Against Presentism” by Jane Loo (25 Mar)

The metaphysical doctrine of presentism has long been suspected of running into trouble with the special theory of relativity, and I argue that these suspicions are well founded.

If the presentist insists on retaining the original form of presentism, which requires an absolute notion of simultaneity, the form of presentism that results, point presentism, is untenable. Alternatively, if the presentist modifies classical presentism to accommodate a relativistic conception of simultaneity, the result is ambiguous, and there are three possible variants of presentism, (1) Relativist presentism, (2) Chauvinistic presentism, and (3) Bowtie presentism, none of which are tenable as well.

Lastly, I discuss cone presentism, which avoids the problems faced by simultaneity defined classical presentism, but faces different problems that arise as a result of its altered definition of “presence”. I argue that cone presentism is also not tenable, and that there is no way to reconcile either presentism or any recognizable descendant thereof with a relativistic conception of spacetime.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 25 Mar 2014
Time: 3 pm – 4 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Jane Loo
Moderator: Elena Ziliotti

About the Speaker:

JANE_gradprofilepicJane’s main area of research is in the philosophy of space and time, with a focus on modern physics and its influence on traditional theories of time. Her other research interests include personal identity, and applied ethics.

“Defending Supererogation” by Feng Lin (18 Mar)

Supererogation is a concept for a class of acts that goes beyond the call of obligation. There is a view called Anti-supererogation claiming that there is no such act that is both morally good while not obligatory. I will defend supererogation by trying to refute arguments for anti-supererogation, and by showing that some morally good acts “cannot” be obligatory and hence they are supererogatory acts.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 18 Mar 2014
Time: 3 pm – 4 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Feng Lin
Moderator: Li Qingyi

About the Speaker:

Feng LinLin Feng’s particular area of research is metaethics, as well as philosophy of language. She is also interested in philosophy of mind, and other topics in Anglo-American philosophy. She has been mainly writing on metaethics, including shame in morality, Darwall’s second-person standpoint and obligation, and Supererogation. Now she is working on faultless disagreement.

“Defending reason-motivation internalism” by Melvin Ng (18 Mar)

One version of reason-motivation internalism states that if a consideration is a reason for me to Φ, then I must be motivated to Φ, if I were rational.  Julia Markovits challenges reason-motivation internalism with various counter-examples. One class of counter-examples involves things that you purportedly have reason to do, but that you would never be motivated to do, if and because you were rational. My first aim is to refute this class of counter-examples.

My second aim is to explain my motivation for doing so. Markovits makes a distinction between internalism and the thesis that there is a necessary relation between an agentʼs having a reason and some psychological, usually motivational, fact about the agent (what I shall call the Humean Theory of Reason, or HTR). Markovits rejects internalism but endorses HTR. Coming from the position of a moral error-theorist, I shall explain why I would not accept Markovitsʼ uncommon position, and in doing so, explain my motivation for defending internalism.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 18 Mar 2014
Time: 2 pm – 3 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Melvin Ng
Moderator: Feng Lin

About the Speaker:

melvin_ngNg Han Wei Melvin is a part-time M.A. student, whose main interest is in metaethics. He is a moral error theorist. In other words, he believes there are no objective moral facts, and people are by-and-large mistaken about morality. Chat with him to find out how he thinks he can still discuss moral issues if he does not believe there are objectively true answers to moral questions. Alternatively chat with him on any topics in philosophy. He also teaches philosophy to young teenagers in a local secondary school, and is interested in both the philosophy of pedagogy and pedagogy of philosophy.

“The Case Against ‘Objects and Persons'” by Chong Bao Shen Kenneth (19 Mar)

Consider the following argument in which a baseball shatters a window:

1)  The baseball – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms, acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window.

2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert.

3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined.

4) If the baseball exists, it does not cause the shattering of the window. (In other words, it is causally redundant).

Call this the ‘Overdetermination Argument’. Trenton Merricks, in his book, Objects and Persons, takes this argument to show, as I will present, that macroscopic, inanimate objects like tables and chairs don’t exist. At the same time, Merricks thinks persons are not likewise eliminated as persons have causal relevancy by virtue of being conscious. I disagree with Merricks. I believe that if the Overdetermination Argument works at all against ordinary objects, it should work against persons too. I present 3 reasons for rejecting his ontology: two have got to with rejecting the premises involved in his argument for differentiating persons from ordinary objects. The last has got to with a consequence of his position: as I will suggest, if Merricks is right, it would seem that persons exist when they are conscious, but not when they are unconscious.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 19 Mar 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3-03-02) (Please note that we are not using our regular venue)
Speaker: Chong Bao Shen Kenneth, MA Student

About the Speaker

Kenneth is currently pursuing his MA at NUS, where he is receiving some pressure to be a dualist under the supervision of his supervisor. In his free time, Kenneth enjoys playing all sorts of games, which might help explain his interest in Philosophy. He also enjoys writing plays and listening to music.

“Autonomy for Who: The Fool, The Villain and The Innocent” by Goh Wee Kian Gary (12 Mar)

Reserving the right to autonomy for those with the capacity for autonomy seems innocuous at first. After all, why should the law protect some ability you do not possess? But when the right at stake is the right to direct one’s life, it is not so clear who does not possess this power. The problem may still appear marginal if people with mental disabilities are the only ones whose ability is so called into question. But if I can show that the political theory and cognitive neuroscience behind a capacity-implies-right model of autonomy could potentially withhold the average citizen’s right to autonomy, then this model starts to look more sinister. To build this case I examine the fundamental liberal principle as well as definitions of disability and autonomy. I argue that given the ambiguities in how disability and autonomy are defined, setting out to exclude people with mental disabilities from a right to autonomy will wind up being very illiberal.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 12 Mar 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3-03-02) (Please note that we are not using our regular venue)
Speaker: Goh Wee Kian Gary, MA Student

About the Speaker

Gary’s background is in European history, politics and philosophy, but he is interested in Chinese and/or Buddhist philosophy. He is thus hoping to marry the two in ethical inquiry. Specifically, he is in it in the long haul to provide an account of a way of living that is ethical and prudent but does not assume much about normativity or objective values.

“Motivation for Human Excellence: Is Infinite Utility the Trigger?” by Mitradutta Mohapatra (5 Mar)

The very notion of ‘Infinite Utility’ has always been eclipsed with dubious philosophical credentials. The term ‘Infinite’ is extremely loaded and therefore, one is generally advised to use the word with enough care and caution. In this paper, I shall try to examine the driving force behind the motivation for exemplary human excellence. Human and philosophical history has shown us time and again that the force that drives an agent on the path of extra-ordinary excellence carries a sort of resolve that is beyond human comprehension. What is the motivation that makes Jesus seek divine pardon for his adversaries at the time of his crucification? How can an Ibn Arabi at the face of the hard-coded canon laws of Islam, spread the message of supreme love, consistently throughout his life, unafraid of the likely violent repercussions? What motivates Buddha to be uniquely consistent throughout his life with his exemplary practice and message of supreme human conduct? What is driving this motivation? Is there a case to examine whether at the core of such motivation does lie the concept of ‘Infinite Utility’? Using the analytic techniques of decision theory, I would argue that there possibly remains a case prima facie.

Graduate Seminar Series.
Date: Tuesday, 5 Mar 2013
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Mitradutta Mohapatra, PhD Student

Mitradutta Mohapatra holds an MA from University of Mumbai and he is exposed to both Indian and Western philosophical traditions. He is keen to look at various aspects of moral philosophy and more particularly, his interest lies in ‘applied ethics’. His current research interest at NUS is to have a closer look at the evolution of compliance governance in the contemporary business world and examine its compatibility with the ethical theories and the traditional tenets of human morality.

“The Problem of Choice in the Analects” by So Young Moon

Graduate Seminar Series: 3 Apr 2012, 3-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: So Young Moon, PhD Student

Abstract:

A discourse on the problem of choice in Confucian ethic system has been contentious topic since the last 20th century. In this presentation, I will examine different point of views on the problem of choice in Confucian philosophy by several scholars and present my view on this problem especially in the Analects. The notion of choice in the Analects does not have the same implications of Western notion of choice. What I want to focus on in this presentation is that how the problem of choice can be viewed in the Analects and how this view differs from those of Western traditions.

About the Speaker: So Young holds an MA from Sungkyunkwan University in South Korea. Her study is mainly in early Confucian philosophy, and she wrote her MA thesis on Confucius’ renxue in the Analects. Her current research interests in NUS are early Chinese philosophy, including Confucianism, Daoism, and thoughts of the other schools in the pre-Qin period. Also, she is interested in Comparative Philosophy and Ethics.