Author Archives: Chong-Ming LIM

Singapore Management University (SMU) Social Sciences and Humanities Seminar Series

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Singapore Management University (SMU) Social Sciences and Humanities Seminar Series presents:

Topic: Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility
Abstract

Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered in this talk render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a way of going wrong under Dretske’s lead. We shall see that Cartesian skepticism thrives on closure failure in a way that is yet to be acknowledged in the literature. The skeptic can make do with principles which are weaker than the familiar closure principles. But I will further claim that this is only a momentary reprieve for the skeptic. As it turns out, one of the weaker principles on which a skeptical modus tollens must rest can be shown false.

Please click HERE to download paper
Chair: Associate Professor John Williams
Presenter: Professor Claudio de Almeida
Pontifical Catholic University at Porto Alegre, Brazil
Date: Friday, 25 March 2011
Time: 3.30 pm – 5.00 pm
Venue: Seminar Room 4.1, Level 4
School of Social Sciences
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903                                                            (location map)
Registration: Click here to register.

For more information, please refer to http://www.socsc.smu.edu.sg/events/seminar_series/social_sciences_2011.asp

Talk: The Foundations of Sovereign Power in the Han Feizi: the Paradox of the Norm and the Exception, by Albert Galvany (17 March 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 17 March 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Albert Galvany, Marie Curie Fellow at the Faculty of Humanities of the University Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain); and Research Associate at the Dept. of East Asian Studies of the University of Cambridge; Moderator: Professor Lisa Raphals

Abstract: The main theoretical initiatives that have been undertaken to resolve the conflicts inherent in political organization tend to identify the passions, the intrinsically impetuous side of human beings, as the main pitfall. Unlike all these efforts to reduce or tame people’s impulses, the Han Feizi considers that the instinctive dimension driving men to pursue what gives them pleasure and to reject what displeases them not only does not pose a problem for the project of achieving an effective political order, but also constitutes, in itself, the true foundation of the social order, the only possibility for fashioning a lasting social peace. The inclinations and aversions peculiar to human beings are what make possible, in the last instance, the application of punishments and rewards, that is, the true cement of law (fa) and, by extension, life in society. But if human beings are essentially defined by their impulsive quest for profit and the avoidance of damage, what happens then with those who do not fit in this scheme, with those who do not accept rewards and do not dare punishments? And, more important, is the sovereign also included in this human nature driven by passions according to the Han Feizi? These are some of the questions that I will try to solve in my talk.

Galvany3About the speaker:Albert Galvany is a Marie Curie Fellow at the Faculty of Humanities of the University Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain) and Research Associate at the Dept. of East Asian Studies of the University of Cambridge. He has written a number of scientific papers on early Chinese intellectual history and classical Chinese philosophy for peer-reviewed journals such as Études Chinoises, Asiatische Studien, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Monumenta Serica, Philosophy East and West, and Asia Major.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: Perceptual Constancy and the Sensation/Perception Distinction, by John O’Dea (15 March 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 15 March 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: John O’Dea, Assistant Professor,  University of Tokyo; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: Under non-ideal conditions, which are most conditions, objects can appear to have properties which we know they do not have. A coin held at an angle can look oval, not circular. This phenomenon, which introduces the first of Russell’s Problems of Philosophy, always  accompanies its opposite, namely perceptual constancy, our tendency to compensate for conditions and perceive things more or less as they really are.  We are not fooled by the angle of the coin.  The role, and indeed reality, of perceptual “mere appearances” as the other side of perceptual constancy has been a vexed issue for theories of perceptual experience for many years. In this talk I sketch a new theory of the role that perceptual constancy plays in perceptual experience which, I will argue, can make sense of it all. It will emerge that some classes of allegedly simple experiences, such as the visual experience of redness, are actually impossible given our perceptual systems.

ODEAAbout the speaker: Dr. John O’Dea is an Assistant Professor at the University of Tokyo.  He obtained his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Monash University, Australia, in 2002, and has written mainly on philosophical problems associated with consciousness, and perceptual experience in particular.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: A Normative Theory of Social Institutions, by Seumas Miller (22 Feb 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 22 February 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Seumas Miller, Professor of Philosophy, Charles Sturt University and Australian National University; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: In this paper I present a teleological normative account of social institutions. On this type of account the definition of a social institution will typically include a description of the human good or social benefit that it purports to produce. For example, universities purport to produce knowledge and understanding, language enables the communication of truths, marriages facilitate the raising and moral development of children, economic systems ought to produce material well-being, and so on. Such goods or benefits are collective in character.

The notion of a collective good in the context of this teleological normative account of social institutions is not that of a public good familiar in economics. Rather a collective good can be understood as a good (Miller 2010: Chapter 2): (1) produced, maintained and/or renewed by means of the joint activity of members of organisations (e.g. schools, hospitals, governments, business firms) i.e. by institutional role occupants; (2) made available to the whole community (e.g. food, security, banking services); and (3)one which ought to be produced (or maintained or renewed) and made available to the whole community because they are desirable (as opposed to merely desired) and such that the members of the community have an (institutional) joint moral right to them (Miller 2010: Chapter 2).

millerAbout the speaker: Seumas Miller is Professor of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University and the Australian National University, and Director of the ANU division of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (an Australian Research Council Special Research Centre). He is the author of Social Action (Cambridge University Press, 2001), Terrorism and Counter-terrorism (Blackwell 2009), and Moral Foundations of Social Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: The Language of the Ontology Room, by Dan Korman (15 Feb 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 15 February 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Dan Korman, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: Various prominent views in material-object metaphysics-for instance, eliminativism, according to which there are no statues or chairs, and universalism, according to which there is an object composed of your nose and the Eiffel Tower- seem manifestly at odds with things we are ordinarily inclined to say and believe. Defenders of these views often maintain that the conflict is merely apparent; what they are saying in the “ontology room” is entirely compatible with the things we ordinarily say and believe. I critically assess a variety of such compatibilist accounts.

dan kormanAbout the speaker: Dan Korman is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Illinois and is currently visiting the Australian National University as a research fellow. He is primarily interested in the metaphysics of material objects. When he tries to work on this topic he finds himself distracted by the philosophy of perception, the ontology of documents, Locke on substratum, the nature and status of intuition, and anything having anything to do with Naming and Necessity.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: The Instrumental Relation, by John Maier (14 Feb 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 14 February 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: John Maier, Postdoctoral Fellow, RSSS Philosophy Program, Australia National University; Moderator: Dr. Neil Sinhababu

Abstract: Rationality enjoins us to take the means to our intended ends. A number of philosophers have asked why, and in what sense, this is so. I discuss a seemingly more fundamental question: what is it for a given action to be a means to a given end? I argue against several natural answers to this question, and propose a different answer. I close by considering what bearing the answer to this formal question has on substantive issues about instrumental rationality.

jmaierAbout the speaker: John Maier is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the RSSS Philosophy Program. He received his Ph.D from Princeton in 2008. In 2008-2009, he was a Visiting Instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He works mainly in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind and action.

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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

John Maier is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the RSSS Philosophy Program. He received his Ph.D from Princeton in 2008. In 2008-2009, he was a Visiting Instructor at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He works mainly in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind and action.

Talk: Reconceiving Evolvability – A Novel Analysis Using Conditional Probability, by Rachael Brown (8 Feb 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 8 February 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Rachel Brown, Australian National University; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: The meaning of the term “evolvability” has long been ambiguous within evolutionary biology. Because of this, interpreting and understanding statements made in the literature of the field such as “x is more evolvable than y” has been very difficult. In this paper I propose a novel analysis of evolvability using conditional probability that provides a “common currency” for discussions in the field. This account allows us to easily represent common statements about evolvability currently seen in the literature. In addition, it provides a framework via which we can assess the presence and nature of causal relationships between small scale features of the world and higher level evolutionary patterns. This has important implications for future research in evolvability.

About the speaker: Rachael Brown is a final year PhD candidate in the School of Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University in Canberra supervised by Kim Sterelny, Paul Griffiths and Brett Calcott.  She is also a member of Tempo & Mode: Centre for Macroevolution and Macroecology, ANU. Prior to this she completed degrees in Zoology and the History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Melbourne. Her primary research interests lie at the intersection of Philosophy, Evolutionary Biology and the study of animal behaviour.

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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: Philosophy of Comparison and Comparative Philosophy, by Ralph Weber (25 Jan 2010)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 25 January 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Ralph Weber, Senior Researcher and Lecturer, Zurich University; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy; but surprisingly it has received scant attention by philosophers. This is no different in ‘comparative philosophy’, which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being ‘comparative’. In the talk, I shall argue for the need of a philosophy of comparison with a view to comparative philosophy. My focus will be on highlighting and problematizing one important element in any comparison: the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison). In the view that I shall defend there is no such thing as incomparability: anything can indeed be compared to anything. This finding, however, in no way decreases the importance of giving reasons why, say, Aristotle should be compared to Mencius or why conceptions of life in Greek and Chinese antiquity should particularly recommend themselves for comparison. If anything, I shall argue, it follows that reasons are even more important. To illustrate this latter claim, I shall relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled ‘comparative philosophy’, and point out some of its largely unquestioned presumptions, particularly in light of their political implications. This political dimension of comparative philosophy is all too seldom reflected upon, which leaves the work of comparative philosophers unprotected from serving diverse political purposes – which may or may not be coextensive with the purposes they originally had in mind.

Ralph Weber _smallAbout the speaker: Dr. Ralph Weber is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer and Head of a Research Group on ‘Comparative Conceptual Research’ at the University Research Priority Program Asia and Europe of Zurich University, Switzerland. He regularly teaches doctoral seminars on varying topics at the University of Zurich as well as courses on the History of Political Ideas and Political Theory at the University of St. Gallen. His research interests are comparative philosophy, classical and contemporary Confucianism, and pragmatist political philosophy. He has published articles in journals such as Philosophy East and West, Asian Philosophy, Third World Quarterly and Zhexuemen. Forthcoming is a co-edited volume on Modernities: Sites, Concepts and Temporalities in Asia and Europe.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Dr. Ralph Weber is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer and Head of a Research Group on ‘Comparative Conceptual Research’ at the University Research Priority Program Asia and Europe of Zurich University, Switzerland. He regularly teaches doctoral seminars on varying topics at the University of Zurich as well as courses on the History of Political Ideas and Political Theory at the University of St. Gallen. His research interests are comparative philosophy, classical and contemporary Confucianism, and pragmatist political philosophy. He has published articles in journals such as Philosophy East and West, Asian Philosophy, Third World Quarterly and Zhexuemen. Forthcoming is a co-edited volume on Modernities: Sites, Concepts and Temporalities in Asia and Europe.

Talk: The Precautionary Approach and the Role of Scientists in Environmental Decision-Making, by Jan Sprenger (18 Jan 2011)

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Philosophy Seminar Series: 18 January 2011, 2-3:45pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Jan Sprenger, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Tilburg University; Moderator: Dr. Tang Weng Hong

Abstract: The role of scientists in environmental decision-making has recently been the subject of vivid discussion. It might be surmised that scientists have played their part in advising policy-makers as soon as they have assessed the amount of uncertainty, or established a particular hypothesis. Against this view, I argue that also in the genuine decision-makers process, scientists need to be included: environmental decision-making often has to follow a precautionary approach, and the exact decision-theoretic implications thereof are highly sensitive to the specific epistemic context we are in. Calibrating a decision rule with scope and nature of uncertainty in a decision problem is not possible without scientific understanding of the underlying environmental system. Therefore, scientists cannot and should not be restricted to purely epistemic tasks in environmental decision-making.

Please find two recent papers here and here.

IMG_1124About the speaker: Jan Sprenger (www.laeuferpaar.de) an is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Tilburg University and Resident Fellow at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS). After completing a mathematics degree, he gained a Ph.D. in philosophy in 2008 at the University of Bonn, Germany. Jan works mostly in philosophy of science, in particular the foundations of statistical inference, formal epistemology and decision theory.
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More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

Talk: Humanity between Gods and Beasts? Ontologies in Question, by Sir G. E. R. Lloyd (13 Jan 2011)

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Professor Sir Geoffrey Lloyd, Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy and Science at the University of Cambridge, will be giving a talk titled “Humanity between Gods and Beasts? Ontologies in Question”.

Date: Tuesday 11 Jan 2011, 6:00pm to 7:00pm
Location: LT 13, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,NUS, Kent Ridge Campus

Please find more details for the talk at this link: http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/sts/newsevents/e_talkGLloyd.html