According to truth pluralism there is not a single property of truth but many: propositions from different areas of discourse are true in different ways. This position has been challenged to make sense of validity, understood as necessary truth preservation, when inferences involving propositions from different areas (and different truth properties as well) are involved.
To solve this problem, a natural temptation is that of replicating the standard practice in many valued logic, thus appealing to the notion of designated values. Validity would just be preservation of designation.
Such a simple approach, however, is usually considered a non starter, since, in this context, ‘designation’ seems to embody nothing but a notion of generic truth, namely what truth pluralists abhor.
In my talk, I show how to defend such a simple solution relying on designation by exploring the analogy with Many-Valued Logic even further. I argue that truth pluralism can be coherently formulated in a many valued setting, and that a suitable version of it is already available.
Date: 21 November 2019
Time: 2pm to 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room (AS3-05-23)
About the Speaker:
Andrea Strollo is currently Assistant Professor at Nanjing University (China). He received his PhD from Turin University (Italy) and got research positions at the University of Helsinki (Finland) and Scuola Normale Superiore (Italy). He works mainly on the notion of truth, trying to keep philosophical and formal approaches together. He also has research interests in Philosophy of Language and Logic in general.
More information and contact details can be found at his personal website: https://sites.google.com/site/andreastrollophilosophy/home
All are welcome