2.00pm to 2.45pm
1st Presentation by Ms Mary Ann Lim Hui Ming
The virtuous life, the just life and the good life: Examining eudaimonia in the Crito
Ancient ethical Greek thought is commonly understood through its commitments to the concept of eudaimonism. As such an extensive amount of philosophical literature has been dedicated to examining the role of eudaimonia within Socratic thought, and its relation towards the virtues he directly addresses in the Socratic dialogues as chronicled by Plato.
However, while eudaimonism holds a substantial role in the arguments found within the Crito, there has been little scholarly work dedicated towards examining the specific function eudaimonism has in motivating Socrates’ arguments against why he should escape his inevitable death sentence.
As such, the main portion of my thesis hopes to provide an adequate interpretation of how readers might plausibly understand Socrates’ assertions of eudaimonistics in the Crito. More specifically I will examine these assertions through their relations with virtue that Socrates refers to in Crito, in attempting to provide a clearer picture of how these different relational interpretations might affect the larger arguments made in the Crito.
2.45pm to 3.30pm
2nd Presentation by Mr Teng Kuan Ping
Is Rationality Empirically Testable?
Violations of formal rules – for example, the probability axioms – are taken by some researchers to indicate a kind of human irrationality. The empirical results are said to provide evidence for this. But there are unresolved issues about the appropriate standard of rationality to use, about what counts as a good test, and about whether there can be one in the first place. I first clarify these issues, and then raise doubts about whether these tests can be done in a meaningful way.
3.30pm to 4.15pm
3rd Presentation by Ms Yeo Jie Ling Zoey
Role or Virtue Ethics?
A critical rejoinder to Ames’ and Rosemont’s claim that role ethics is distinct from virtue ethics
This thesis argues against Ames’ and Rosemont’s claim that role ethics, which they propose as an interpretation of Confucian ethics, is distinct from virtue ethics. in so doing, they argue against the dominant interpretation of Confucian ethics in recent philosophical literature as a form of virtue ethics. They chose to distance Confucian ethics from virtue ethics based on their construal of the latter on a familiar category of Western ethical theory – Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, the assumption that all forms of virtue ethics are theoretically equivalent to Aristotelian virtue ethics is groundless. Virtue ethics, as a genus, is able to accommodate role ethics as a species. This thesis is not concerned with whether Confucian ethics is best read as role ethics or virtue ethics; rather, this is a theoretical project aiming to show that role ethics is not conceptually distinct from virtue ethics and is, in fact, a variety of virtue ethics.
4.15pm to 5.00pm
4th Presentation by Mr Yeo Xiao Feng Kaine
Responsibility without Volitional Control
When are moral agents open to appropriate responses on the basis of what they do or how they are? That is, when are they morally responsible? Some believe that it is only when agents possess volitional control in some relevant way. Others disagree, for they believe that when an agent’s actions or states are indicative of the agent’s moral self, responsibility obtains even without volitional control. My project is threefold. First, I argue for the latter view over the former view. Next, I provide the strongest particular account of this view. Finally, I consider the implications of this account: for what might it consider us responsible?
All are welcome