Stoljar’s dilemma, Hempel’s dilemma and the notion of the physical
The most common strategy to define what the physical is and, therefore, to understand what physicalism says, consists in appealing to the posits of physics. However, Hempel’s dilemma and Stoljar’s dilemma have shown the limits of this approach. In this paper I present a new strategy to define physicalism that does not appeal to the posits of physics. I will argue that the notion of physicalism defended here is immune to the worries raised by the dilemmas and that it brings some virtues of its own.
Date: 17 January 2017
Time: 10am to 12pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room, AS3-05-23
About the Speaker:
Erick is a PhD candidate at the ANU working on metaphysics. His work focuses mostly on the hard problem of consciousness and identity. He is currently developing a non-reductive identity view between the mind and the body that can make sense of both physicalistic and dualistic intuitions without falling into the problems of the views.
ALL ARE WELCOME !!!