Hume’s Workshop organized by Dr Qu Hsueh Ming

Intersections: On the Conventional and the Sceptical in Hume’s Philosophy
Talk by David Premsharan, Philosophy Student, NUS

In light of the sceptical elements present in 1.4.7 of the Treatise and Hume’s emphasis on the inadequacy of rational justification for our doxastic practices, I will be concerned primarily with the broadly non-rational means by which we arbitrate between beliefs and belief-forming mechanisms. I read Hume as offering an account on which the judgements we make regarding whether a belief is justified or not, bottom out in whether conventional criteria are met. If a belief is in accordance with a social or linguistic convention and that convention has been satisfactorily established, then that belief is justified. I highlight areas of the Treatise and the Enquiries where I believe conventional criteria are active and attempt to reconstruct a viable programme for conventional justification.

 

“Probable Evidence and Rules of Logic in Hume’s Skepticism with Regard to Reason”
Talk by Don Garrett, Silver Professor of Philosophy, New York University

In Treatise 1.4.1, “Of scepticism with regard to reason,” Hume draws two conclusions: (1) “all knowledge degenerates into probability”; and (2) “in every judgment, which we can form concerning probability … all the rules of logic require a continual diminution and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence.” Yet he also intends to provide a “compleat system of the sciences” on a new and “secure” foundation, and he repeatedly states that some things are much more probable than others. Many readers have found this to be inconsistent. I will first examine (i) what Hume means by the key terms of his conclusions; (ii) what the significance is of his claim in T 1.4.1 and elsewhere that belief and probable reasoning are “sensitive”; (iii) what “all the rules of logic” are for him; and (iv) what arguments he gives for the two conclusions. I will then use the results of these examinations to explain how Hume’s two conclusions are compatible with his scientific intentions and differential probabilism.

 

Date: Thursday, 12 Jan 2017
Time: 2pm – 5.30pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room, AS3 #05-23

 

All are welcome !!!

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