Honours Thesis Presentation

You are invited to attend the HT presentations. Each presentation will be about 20 minutes, followed by about 15 minutes of question time.

Date: Friday, 01 Nov 2012
Time: 2-4pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room, AS3-05-23.

Presenter:  Miss Loo Wei Ling, Jane
: 2pm to 2:35pm
:  Presentism and Special Relativity

Presentism is the view that only what presently exists is real. This view is coherent within the framework of a classical Newtonian conception of space and time, but it is no longer so when we move to a relativistic conception of spacetime. Mark Hinchliff in his paper “A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting” suggests three models that make presentism and the special theory of relativity compatible. Two of these models involve redefining the present, and the other involves an alternative interpretation of special relativity. I argue that none of these models are acceptable, and that the two theories are not compatible.

Presenter : Miss Ng Ee Tien, Georgina
: 2:35pm to 3:10pm
: Intuitionism, disagreement and off-track influences

Michael Huemer argues that if we reject ethical intuitionism, the theory that we are prima facie, non-inferentially justified in believing our ethical intuitions, we would also have to reject basic logical intuitions, forcing us into a kind of philosophical skepticism. I attempt to refute this, firstly, by giving reasons (based on considerations of disagreement and off-track influences) to distrust our ethical intuitions, our awareness of which would prevent us from reasonably accepting that we are non-inferentially justified in believing such intuitions. Secondly, I show that these reasons do not apply to our basic logical intuitions, which implies that Huemer is wrong and we can accept the notion of non-inferential justification for our logical, but not ethical intuitions.

Presenter: Mr. Han Yong Ming
Time: 3:10pm to 3:45pm
Title: Not received from Yong Ming yet.

Abstract:  Not received from Yong Ming yet.

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