“On Using Moral Intuitions in Philosophy” by Sulastri Noordin (GRS Presentation)

Graduate Seminar Series: 3 Apr 2012, 2-3pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Sulastri Noordin, MA Student

Abstract:

In this talk, I will present a small part of my dissertation project. It is common philosophical practice to apply moral principles to particular situations, and then to compare the moral judgements generated to people’s intuitive moral judgements about the same situations. I seek to clarify what exactly it is that philosophers are doing with intuitions when they carry out this practice. I claim that they could be doing at least two things: (i) treating moral intuitions as phenomena, which it is the job of moral theories to simply describe/systematise, or (ii) treating moral intuitions as independent evidence in support of or against moral theories. I will attempt to establish what conditions have to hold, in order for moral intuitions to properly serve these uses.

About the Speaker: Sulastri is working towards her Masters degree. She received her BA (Hons) in philosophy from NUS, where she was awarded the Philosophy Book Prize. Sulastri’s particular area of interest is in philosophical methodology. Her dissertation project examines the use of moral intuitions in ethics. To that end, her interests also extend to moral psychology, experimental philosophy, and heuristics and cognitive biases, in hopes of finding interdisciplinary work that sheds light on methodological issues in philosophy. She lives in a quiet neighbourhood with her cat, Immanuel.

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