HY2206: China's Imperial Past

Author(s)

Introduction

This paper seeks to unravel the historical politico-cultural identity of Vietnamese dynasties, specifically pertaining to their self-identification as “China”. Accounting for their active association with “China” and their highly Sinicised culture, worldview and political system, this paper asserts that Vietnamese dynasties very much considered themselves part of the realm of “China”, insofar as the geographical space of “China” was conceptualised as being politically divided amongst multiple regimes. Crucially, Vietnamese dynasties, contrary to what nationalist narratives might lead one to believe, consistently adopted various proper nouns of China for self-reference, promoted discourses and initiated government policies based on a sentiment of superiority informed by the Sino–barbarian dichotomy. Following this logic, rather than regarding Vietnamese dynasties as independent regimes entirely distinct from their Chinese counterparts per se, they could instead be perceived in a similar vein as other non-Han polities in Chinese history that also pursued an expansive definition of “China” ethnically, culturally and territorially. To avoid potential confusion with the contemporary realm of China and its direct predecessors, this paper will employ “Zhongguo” as a general substitute for “China” due to its relatively common usage, except in cases where Vietnamese sources explicitly referenced other such proper nouns as “Xia”, “Zhongxia” and “Shenzhou”, among others.

Adoption of proper nouns of China for self-reference

The self-conception of Vietnamese dynasties as part of the realm of “Zhongguo” is evident in their frequent use of proper nouns of China for self-reference. As the proverb “[if] the name is inappropriate, then the spoken words will not ring true” from the Analects alludes to, the paramount importance assigned to names by the Chinese is undeniable, to the extent that they directly concern political legitimacy and the effectiveness of governance.[1] For its highly Confucianised culture and political structure, it is logical to suggest that the Vietnamese subscribed to the same conviction as the Chinese and certainly did not fortuitously arrive at using proper nouns of China for self-reference without much deliberation. Indeed, the names of individuals symbolise the inheritance of a familial bloodline and mark one’s identity within a social group, to the exclusion of “outsiders”; the same could be said of regimes and the political implications that proper nouns engender.[2]

As a prominent example, “Zhongguo” appeared as a synonym for various Vietnamese regimes throughout the Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư commissioned by the Later Lê dynasty. Volume 3 of “Annals” mentioned that “Lý Giác was exiled to Champa and exposed the domestic situation of Zhongguo”.[3] Likewise, in Volume 10 of “Annals”, “Zhongguo” once again referred to Vietnam: “When the Hồ dynasty usurped the throne of the Trần dynasty, the people of Ming invaded southwards … The courageous people of Zhongguo feinted submission as [Ming] officials and resettled in the north”.[4] In another case, Gia Long Đế famously proclaimed: “The late king managed [the affairs of] all under Heaven by segregating barbarians from Xia”.[5] Volume 1 of “Prequel” of the Khâm định Việt sử Thông giám cương mục composed by the Nguyễn dynasty recorded that “our Thế Tổ Cao Hoàng đế pacified Shenzhou and fully occupied [the lands of] Việt”.[6]

Since identifying Vietnam using names of China and claiming to rule over the territories of Việt were not mutually exclusive, much like Sichuan-based polities claiming to rule over the lands of Shu, “Việt” could therefore be understood as a geographical region that constituted the wider realm of “Zhongguo”. Whereas “Zhongguo” might be perceived in a literal sense – the idea of a geographical or cultural “middle state” vis-à-vis the “periphery” – and thus devoid of connections with China, the fact that Vietnamese dynasties also utilised other proper nouns of China with specific cultural and political connotations effectively repudiates such a perspective. Moreover, given that various names of China served as direct synonyms for the Vietnamese regimes themselves, it is apparent that such cases of self-reference involved an indispensable political dimension. Owing to the vital role of names as potent signifiers of identity, it is inconceivable that Vietnamese dynasties would adopt certain proper nouns without genuinely identifying with the politico-cultural connotations that such names conferred, especially when they actively did so on their own volition.

Incidentally, Vietnamese regimes maintained a unique conception of their relations with their Chinese counterparts, insofar as narratives on the “North” and “South” repeatedly underscored Vietnam’s geographical location in relation to Chinese dynasties, with the overall effect of portraying both as inherently belonging to the same politico-cultural realm of “Zhongguo”. As Vietnamese dynasties claimed such proper nouns as “Zhongguo” for themselves, Chinese regimes were never referred to by these names; rather, Chinese dynasties were generally known to their Vietnamese counterparts by their formal dynastic names or as “Bắc triều”, meaning the “Northern dynasty”.[7] As a case in point, “Prologue” of Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư stated that: “Successive rulers of the Northern dynasties used the title of emperor, such that we both were emperors in our respective lands.”[8] Similarly, Vietnam’s self-portrayal as “Nam triều” or the “Southern dynasty” is exemplified in the poem Nam quốc sơn hà which opened with: “The Southern state [composing of] mountains and rivers [is where the] Southern emperor resides.”[9] From these examples, it is obvious that Vietnamese dynasties conceived their relations with Chinese dynasties as some sort of “Northern and Southern dynasties”, akin to the Liao–Song–Jin political configuration that arose following the collapse of the Tang dynasty.[10] If Vietnamese regimes did not deem themselves part of the realm of “Zhongguo” or that they merely sought to depict themselves as having equal standing as their more prestigious neighbours, this special understanding of bilateral relations would most likely be applied to other contexts, particularly with the once-powerful Khmer Empire that could have been labelled as the “Western dynasty”. The only logical explanation is that “Zhongguo” as a geographical space essentially took on a broadened scope that encompassed the territories held by Vietnamese regimes in the cognitive imagination of the Vietnamese, with the “Northern dynasty” and “Southern dynasty” referring to different entities within the same realm.

Sentiment of politico-cultural superiority as “Zhongguo”

Vietnamese dynasties often promoted discourses and implemented policies informed by the hierarchical rhetoric of the Sino–barbarian dichotomy, not least since they regarded themselves as rightful hegemons in the Sinocentric order, in line with their self-identification as “Zhongguo”. A significant manifestation of this belief was Vietnam’s replication of the Chinese tributary system. The “Ma Nhai kỷ công bi văn” cliff inscription commemorating the incorporation of a Laotian polity into the Vietnamese orbit made it perspicuous that the claims to hegemony by Vietnamese dynasties were based on a fundamental belief that they represented “Zhongguo”: “The sixth emperor of the imperial Trần dynasty of Việt, the Chương Nghiêu Văn Triết Thái thượng hoàng đế, having been blessed by the Heaven, possessed Zhongxia”.[11] Without discounting the cultural role that narratives like the “civilised Hua” versus the “uncivilised Yi” ultimately instilled a sentiment of Vietnamese superiority vis-à-vis the un-Sinicised “barbarians”, it is also crucial to note that the tributary system served as the basis for foreign relations in the Sinocentric world.[12] Given the strong political implication that the Vietnamese tributary system entailed, it would be misinformed to characterise Vietnam’s claims of ruling “Zhongxia” and the like as purely a result of cultural transmission from China.

Furthermore, other discourses propagated by Vietnamese dynasties based on the Sino–barbarian dichotomy also took on a political dimension, in that cultural dissimilarities became a legitimate excuse for Vietnam to embark on military campaigns in numerous instances. On at least two separate occasions, Lê Thánh Tông invoked the Sino–barbarian dichotomy whilst explicitly positioning the Later Lê dynasty as the authentic representative of “Zhongguo”, such that his conquests of adjacent “barbarian” regimes were rationalised as acts of “pacification” with honourable and righteous intent. In 1479 CE, an edict issued on the eve of a campaign against Ai Lao read: “I emulate the examples of my ancestors, promote and execute a majestic plan, unify Zhongxia, pacify the external barbarians”.[13] In such situations, “Zhongguo” typified a realm of proper moral disposition that the “barbarians” lacked, not least because the latter did not conform to the accepted moral prescriptions that the Vietnamese utilised to judge the level of civilisation. The importance accorded to morals was clearly echoed by the Trần official Lê Văn Hưu who posited that “[in characterising] one as Hua or Yi, only an assessment of his moral virtues is necessary”.[14] All things considered, the Sino–barbarian dichotomy, through offering a cultural basis for propagating discourses, essentially enabled Vietnamese dynasties to legitimately exercise and project its political influence as “Zhongguo”, so much so that the political actions justified through such narratives had the effect of reshaping the regional geopolitical order.

For all their self-identification as “Zhongguo”, Vietnamese dynasties seldom, if at all, exhibited territorial ambition beyond the Việt and Liangguang regions; yet this did not prevent Vietnamese regimes from invalidating the moral legitimacy, if not explicitly denying the political legitimacy, of their Chinese neighbours. Within the Confucian moral universe, it was extremely crucial for the actions and policies of the ruling elites to adhere to an established set of ethical protocols underpinned by the Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues, in particular the virtue of benevolence.[15] For this reason, to accentuate Vietnam’s compliance with Confucian moral codes at the expense of Chinese dynasties, in a binary conception along the line of the “moral” versus the “immoral”, was in essence a rejection of the latter’s rightful claims to being “Zhongguo”. As a justification for attacking the Northern Song dynasty in 1077 CE, the Lý dynasty condemned its Chinese counterpart for having inflicted tremendous suffering on the people as a result of injudicious governance: “In the third month, a massive campaign was once again undertaken against the Song in the Qin and Lian prefectures, on the grounds that the Song’s enforcement of the Green Sprouts Law devastated the people of Zhongguo”.[16]

Correspondingly, the Bình Ngô đại cáo issued in the wake of the Lam Sơn Uprising once again leveraged on Confucian ethics to denounce the “vicious” rule of the Ming dynasty and warranted the rebellion by Vietnamese forces: “Righteousness could finally prevail over brutality, benevolence could replace violence”.[17] Importantly, during the Lam Sơn Uprising, a dictum by Lê Lợi proclaimed: “The purloiner is in Zhongguo, [the livelihoods of] the people are still uncertain … Against the backdrop of the Hồ clan’s lack of moral propriety, the purloiner thus annexed our state”.[18] Here, other than the fact that “Zhongguo” clearly referred to Vietnam, the Ming dynasty was designated as a “purloiner”, in a similar tone as the traditional Chinese tenet from the Three Kingdoms period declaring that “Han and purloiner should not coexist”.[19] Evidently, Vietnamese dynasties regarded themselves as having better embodied and preserved Confucian values than Chinese regimes, thereby articulating the idea that Vietnamese dynasties were equally representative of “Zhongguo” from both cultural and political standpoints, if not more so.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that Vietnamese dynasties very much perceived themselves as constitutive members of the politico-cultural realm of “Zhongguo”, illustrated by their consistent use of proper nouns of China with specific cultural and political connotations for self-reference, and their discourses and policies prompted by a sentiment of superiority based on the Sino–barbarian dichotomy. Apart from the aforementioned points that this paper has elaborated on, Vietnamese monarchs also oftentimes traced their ancestries to historical Chinese figures and sponsored historiographical works to justify such claims. Additionally, Vietnamese ruling elites frequently referenced events, personalities and concepts in Chinese history in their speeches and writings, in a tone that did not convey any sense of “foreignness”. Considering that these phenomena – to be analysed as a given whole – emerged in the context of over a millennium of direct rule by successive Chinese dynasties that eventually gave rise to Vietnam’s highly Sinicised culture and worldview, the overarching assertion proposed by this paper would not appear as absurd as it might originally seem. After all, it is onerous to understate the socialising power that over one millennium of Chinese rule had, insofar as the Vietnamese were oriented to think of themselves as the people of “Zhongguo” due to the combined effect of acculturation and political rule.

Given that the concept of “Zhongguo” remained fluid and had no predetermined and universally accepted definition of its ethnic and territorial compositions, Vietnam’s self-identification as “Zhongguo” therefore also served to enlarge the scope of “Zhongguo” – transcending present-day nationalist conceptions – in much the same way as the Xianbei-led Northern Wei dynasty and the Khitan-led Liao dynasty, among others, did. At times when Vietnamese dynasties emphasised their unique local customs, they ultimately maintained claims to “Zhongguo”; an analogous situation could thus be observed during the Northern and Southern dynasties period in Chinese history, when competing ethnic Xianbei and Han polities articulated their unique local customs when it became impossible to deny that both belonged to the same realm of “Zhongguo”.[20] Indeed, it is within reasonable expectation that as the metageographical realm of “Zhongguo” expanded in the cognitive imagination of individuals, the incorporation of a diversity of ethnicities and local customs into “Zhongguo” would ensue, effectively blurring the imagined boundaries of “Zhongguo”. Vietnamese dynasties, in this sense, could be understood as Sinicised non-Han localised regimes ruling over the southern territories of “Zhongguo” corresponding to the contemporary nation-state of Vietnam. Ergo, characterising the establishment of the Ngô dynasty and the Later Lê dynasty, in 939 CE and 1427 CE respectively, as “Vietnamese independence from China” is problematic, since it misses out on the nuances of historical Vietnamese identity, to the degree that a nationalist framework is retroactively applied. Modern and contemporary political division along the line of nation-states should not be employed in retrospect for historical analyses and narratives, lest the reality of something as intangible as identity gets distorted.[21]

Appendix: Table of translations of Chinese and Vietnamese terms

Endnotes

[1] “名不正，则言不顺”. “Zilu di shisan” 子路第十三 [Zilu No. 13], in Lunyu 论语 [Analects] (N.p.: n.p., n.d.).

[2] Maria Ainciburu and Irene Buttazzi, ““Esa no soy Yo”: Self-Image and Name Change from the Perspective of Female Immigrants,” in Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Sociolinguistic Integration of Migration, ed. Florentino García and María Pascual (Basel, Basel-Stadt: MDPI, 2020), 26.

[3] “李觉亡占城，言中国虚实”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Bản kỷ quyển 3, Lý kỷ, Nhân Tông Hoàng đế” 本纪卷之三·李纪·仁宗皇帝 [Volume 3 of Annals, Annals of Lý, Emperor Nhân Tông], in Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư 大越史记全书 [Complete Annals of Đại Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1479).

[4] “时胡篡陈祚，明人南侵……凡中国豪杰之士，多阳假以官，安𢮿于北”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Bản kỷ quyển 10, Lê hoàng triệu kỷ, Thái Tổ Cao Hoàng đế” 本纪卷之十·黎皇朝纪·太祖高皇帝 [Volume 10 of Annals, Annals of the Imperial Lê Dynasty, Emperor Thái Tổ Cao], in Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư 大越史记全书 [Complete Annals of Đại Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1479).

[5] “先王经理天下，夏不杂夷”. Xie Xuanjun 谢选骏, Di san Zhongguo lun 第三中国论 [The Idea of a Third China] (Morrisville, North Carolina: Lulu.com, 2016), 202.

[6] “奉我世祖高皇帝大定神州，奄有全越”. Phan Thanh Giản 潘清简, “Tiền biên quyển 1” 前编卷之一 [Volume 1 of Prequel], in Khâm định Việt sử Thông giám cương mục 钦定越史通鉴纲目 [Imperially-commissioned Compendium Reflecting the History of Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1884).

[7] Chang Kun-chiang 张昆将, “Yuenan “shichen” yu “shichen” dui “Zhongguo” yishi de fenqi bijiao” 越南“史臣”与“使臣”对“中国”意识的分歧比较 [Comparison of Chinese Consciousness as Expressed by “Official Vietnamese Historians” and “Vietnamese Envoys”], Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (2015): 171.

[8] “北朝历代主皆书帝，与我各帝一方也”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Quyển thủ, Soán tu Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư phàm lệ” 卷首·纂修大越史记全书凣例 [Prologue, Explanatory Notes for the Composition of the Complete Annals of Đại Việt], in Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư 大越史记全书 [Complete Annals of Đại Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1479).

[9] “南国山河南帝居”. Yan Ming 严明, Dongya Hanshi Yanjiu 东亚汉诗研究 [Research on East Asian Han Poetry] (Taipei, Taiwan: Airiti Press, 2014), 63.

[10] Jiang Mei 江湄, “Zenyang renshi 10 zhi 13 shiji Zhonghua shijie de fenlie yu zai tongyi” 怎样认识10至13世纪中华世界的分裂与再统一 [How to Perceive the Disintegration and Reunification of the Zhonghua World in the 10^th to the 13^th Centuries], Journal of Historical Science 6 (2019): 2.

[11] “皇越陈朝第六帝章尧文哲太上皇帝，受天眷命，奄有中夏”. Nguyễn Trung Ngạn 阮忠彥, Ma Nhai kỷ công bi văn 摩崖纪功碑文 [Cliff Inscription of Citation], 1335, inscription carving, Con Cuông, Nghệ An.

[12] Hsiao-Ting Lin, “The Tributary System in China’s Historical Imagination: China and Hunza, ca. 1760–1960,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 19, no. 4 (2009): 489.

[13] “比朕丕绳祖武，光御洪图，倂中夏，抚外夷”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Bản kỷ quyển 13, Lê hoàng triệu kỷ, Thánh Tông Thuần Hoàng đế” 本纪卷之十三·黎皇朝纪·圣宗淳皇帝 [Volume 13 of Annals, Annals of the Imperial Lê Dynasty, Emperor Thánh Tông Thuần], in Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư 大越史记全书 [Complete Annals of Đại Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1479).

[14] 人之华夷，惟德是视也”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Ngoại kỷ quyển 2, Triệu thị kỷ, Vũ Đế” 外纪卷之二·赵氏纪·武帝 [Volume 2 of Peripheral Records, Annals of the Triệu Clan, Emperor Vũ], in Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư 大越史记全书 [Complete Annals of Đại Việt] (N.p.: n.p., 1479).

[15] Christopher Atwood, ed., The Rise of the Mongols: Five Chinese Sources (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2021), 149.

[16] “三月，又大举伐宋钦、廉州，声言宋行清苗役法，残害中国民”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Bản kỷ quyển 3, Lý kỷ, Nhân Tông Hoàng đế” 本纪卷之三·李纪·仁宗皇帝 [Volume 3 of Annals, Annals of Lý, Emperor Nhân Tông].

[17] “卒能以大义而胜凶残，以至仁而易强暴”. Ngô Sĩ Liên 吴士连, “Bản kỷ quyển 10, Lê hoàng triệu kỷ, Thái Tổ Cao Hoàng đế” 本纪卷之十·黎皇朝纪·太祖高皇帝 [Volume 10 of Annals, Annals of the Imperial Lê Dynasty, Emperor Thái Tổ Cao].

[18] “贼在中国，民犹未定……昔胡氏无道，贼因此而夺我国家”. Ibid.

[19] Chang Kun-chiang 张昆将, 177.

[20] David Felt, “The Metageography of the Northern and Southern Dynasties,” T’oung Pao 103, no. 4–5 (2017): 368.

[21] Zhaoguang Ge, Here in ‘China’ I Dwell: Reconstructing Historical Discourses of China for Our Time, trans. Jesse Field and Fang Qin (Leiden, South Holland: Brill, 2017), 25–26.