HY2206: China's Imperial Past

Hi Prof Wang and classmates. Allow me to share my reflections on the media component for week 2!

To me, it was really interesting that such a sophisticated civilisation existed alongside the Shang, as shown by their intricate bronzery. This really forces us to rethink the knowledge we have on the concepts of the word “uncivilised” or “barbarian”. Were the people at Sanxingdui truly “uncivilised”? If we were to impose the standard that civilised means having a written script, then these people at Sanxingdui can truly be considered uncivilsed. This however has great implications. Simply with the lack of written script, the Shang narrative has been given a false centrality in Chinese historiography.

Using Prof Wang’s lens of analysis, in an attempt to move my knowledge up to the higher level of wisdom, I believe this trend is endemic in the subaltern classes in various historiographies, where the voiceless e.g outcastes, workers, peasants, illiterate, and women of various societies remain undocumented.

Hi Clarence, your comments are certainly insightful. Indeed, the subaltern classes are often forgotten in dominant historiography. In the case they are represented, some are wilfully misrepresented and selectively reframed to fit an agenda of the powers today. Even today, there are many questions of how we should best remember those who are illiterate and hence, unable to dictate their own history. One such example I can think of is the early treatment of the indigenous Austronesian peoples in Taiwan by the evacuating KMT government in the 1950s. Due to their representation as the legitimate Chinese government, state narratives have neglected the ethnic diversity of the island, until the dangwai movement emerged in the 1980s, leading up to the celebration of diversity that we see today. Perhaps this is where oral histories come to play as a historical source to foster collective memory of a particular event, or simply remembrance of everyday life, for future generations. It is certainly a space for reflection and can go hand in hand with the predominant state-driven narrative.

Regarding the word ‘barbarian’ and archaeological evidence of their intricate, advanced craftmanship, I thought of an article I read recently where the author argued that when Chinese referred to others as ‘barbarians’, this term did not immediately connotate inferiority or the implications of being ‘uncivilised’. Instead, they used the term to refer to those who were foreigners and foreign to Chinese culture. Over time, the usage of ‘barbarian’ became conflated with our modern negative conceptions. Could it then be that the Chinese were simply pointing out their differences? If so, does our negative interpretations of ‘barbarian’ then reflect our own misgivings?

Hi Clarence and Su Yi,

As someone who is completely unfamiliar with China history, I found your respective posts very insightful and learnt quite a fair bit about China. I think both Clarence and Su Yi raised pertinent issues arising from archaeological findings.

Regarding Clarence question on the representation (or rather, lack of representation) of subaltern classes, is a critical one. Very often artefacts of subaltern or marginalised communities are left undiscovered by historians. This plausibly means that we are indeed learning about prominent individuals in imperial China. This, therefore, obfuscates a holistic understanding of imperial China because we often have trouble understanding minorities or marginalised communities in imperial China. To push insight further, I wonder how historians, including historians studying imperial China, circumvent this problem? One plausible way this challenge can be overcome would be to rely on a multitude of sources. This would mean not just uncovering the “alien masks” uncovered by archaeologists but also rely on written and visual sources. However, even then, as Clarence seemingly alludes to, such sources may only reflect the views of prominent individuals in imperial China. Su Yi brought up the possibility of relying on oral history accounts and I do think there is some value in doing so but what if such accounts are inaccurate or biased. My knowledge about oral history accounts are limited but in my study of Islam, I am aware of the fact that oral history accounts can easily be modified as they are transmitted from one generation to another. In the case of Islam, Hadiths (Prophetic traditions) were previously transmitted orally before it was converted to written form. Concomitantly, we saw the availability of authentic and unauthentic Hadiths today. In the case of Imperial China, I suspect that this could also be the case. Thus, if anyone has suggestions on how this pertinent issue can be overcome, please share your thoughts.

Regarding the inscriptions on the “alien masks,” I thought that the intricate and exquisite designs demonstrate the artistic nature of people in ancient China. This then begs the question: how did they manage to learn advanced craftsmanship, given the absence of modern (laser) technology? As the host rightly points out in the video, “how were they able to learn advanced craftsmanship is likely to forever remain a mystery.” Moreover, I thought that the artefacts related to the Sangxingdui suggest plausible strong trade links and their connection to the Indian Ocean. It makes us wonder how raw materials were traded in ancient China.

I look forward to reading what others have to share about the video!

Hi Everyone,

Thank You for sharing! I definitely agree with Clarence, Su Yi, and Fayyaz’s points about how there is a possibility that written histories could leave out the voices and stories of those who do not assume an important status during those historical times, while there could also be bias or inaccuracies in the oral and written histories that record about life in those historical times. I think that it would be quite difficult for us to overcome these inaccuracies or biases, but I feel that it is still incredibly important to utilize these sources heavily in reconstructing our understanding of the historical period. For example, while The Record of the Grand Historian by Sima Qian has often been questioned for its reliability and accuracy, it has also been frequently used as a broad guide to help us understand imperial China. I think the key thing would be knowing how to discern which sources are more accurate or less biased than the other, possibly through cross-referencing of different sources.

With regards to the video, like Fayyaz, what had captivated me was the bronze statues and masks that were discovered and exhibited. A particular artwork that had caught my attention was the mask that has protruding eyes and wide ears. Looking at pictures of this particular mask had got me wondering if this was created to mirror the appearances of the deities that the people in that period.

Hi Fayyaz

Regarding your point on trade, I do think links with the Indian Ocean seems a little farfetched, given the location of Sanxingdui as a landlocked city or region in the present day Sichuan province. Perhaps however there was overland trade to other polities nearby? Do elaborate on why you think there are links with the Indian Ocean, for I may not know!

Hi Everyone,

I really enjoyed reading all of your inputs. There is so much to discuss, but I’ll just put down my thoughts on Su Yi’s point about the connotations of the word “barbarian”

Firstly, with reference to primary sources in the Chinese language that use this term, it is worth remembering that we are (for the most part) studying translations of these sources in English. Hence, the full implications and nuances of the term may be lost on us. Further exacerbating this barrier is the fact that most of the sources are quite ancient in nature. The social, cultural contexts that the primary authors experienced are different from ours in the 21st Century. (E.g., look at how the word ‘gay’ has been changed in connotation throughout history)

Secondly, I opine that the usage of the word “barbarian” by the Chinese was in order to manifest a socio-cultural identity by emphasizing  the alterity between them and other civilizations. Essentially, we define ourselves by who we are not. Just as there is no such thing as ‘good’ without something ‘bad’, there is no ‘civilized’ without an ‘uncivilized’. This tactic was not exclusive to the Chinese; the Ancient Romans, for example, are famous for referring to non-Roman civilizations as barbaric. Such practices can even be seen in modern secular states and how they build a national identity.

Hi everyone, I think Clarence, Su Yi, Fayyaz, Augusto, and Dae Ern have raised interesting points that are really insightful. Here are just some of my thoughts pertaining to the concept of “barbarian” in Chinese history and the phenomenon that certain groups are not given “enough” prominence in Chinese historiography.

Concept of “barbarian”

One important thing to note is that the ancient Chinese had different terms referring to the “barbarians” residing in different locations. “Barbarians” who lived to the east of “China” were known as “Dongyi” (东夷), those to the west were called “Xirong” (西戎), those to the north were named “Beidi” (北狄), and those to the south were referred to as “Nanman” (南蛮). While these different terms are often translated, accurately or otherwise, into “barbarian” in the English language, it should be quite obvious from the multitude of terms that the ancient Chinese were at least aware of the differences between the multiple “barbarian” groups, even though each of these groups likely consisted of numerous tribes that had different identities and cultures despite being indiscriminately classified by the ancient Chinese based on geography. Translating all these terms into “barbarian” (or other similar words) in the English language definitely misses out on the nuances that are present in the Chinese language.

Another interesting point worth considering is that the idea of “China” and “Chinese” were largely based on culture and identity, and less on race (biological differences) per se (even though racial issues definitely had a profound impact on Chinese history). According to Essentials of the Moral Way (原道) written by the Tang scholar and official Han Yu, “In the Spring and Autumn Annals by Confucius, the feudal lords who practised the rituals of the ‘barbarians’ were considered ‘barbarians’, and those who followed the ways of ‘China’ were considered ‘Chinese'” (孔子之作《春秋》也，诸侯用夷礼，则夷之；进于中国，则中国之). Whereas the Chinese (particularly the ethnic Han) regarded “Chinese” culture to be superior vis-a-vis “non-Chinese” cultures, the politico-cultural realm of “China” was not exclusive, as evident by the aforementioned clause by Han Yu and the process of Sinicisation.

This fluidity of the concepts of “China” and “Chinese” is further illustrated by the identification of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty as “barbarian” by Korea, Vietnam and Japan; these Sinosphere states instead regarded themselves as the true inheritors of the Chinese civilisation, as posited by texts like Chūchō Jijitsu (中朝事实) and Kai Hentai (华夷变态) authored by Japanese scholars of the Edo period. In particular, Kai Hentai famously (and controversially) proclaimed that “The Chongzhen Emperor had passed away, the Hongguang Emperor had been held captive, the Prince of Tang and the Prince of Lu had only managed to retain control of southern China, the Tatar barbarians were on a rampage in the Central Plain, thus this was the process by which the Chinese became the barbarians” (崇祯登天，弘光陷虏，唐鲁才保南隅，鞑虏横行中原，是华变于夷之态也).

In this sense, the historical dichotomy between the “Chinese” and the “barbarians” (or “non-Chinese”), having acquired different meanings by different groups during different periods, was much more complex and not as straightforward as one might originally expect. Ergo, it is perhaps more useful and accurate to see “China” as a “civilisation state” without a fixed or predetermined territory and constituent ethnicity historically, as some scholars like Martin Jacques argue.

Certain groups not given “sufficient” prominence in Chinese historiography

As far as I understand, the phenomenon whereby certain groups are not accorded the amount of attention and prominence that they “deserve” in historiography is not something unique to Chinese historiography. However, I will focus on China for the purpose of this post.

Taking the video on “alien masks” for instance, the Sanxingdui site unearthed in Sichuan is generally identified with the ancient state of Shu that existed alongside the Shang dynasty. Yet such an advanced culture has been neglected, comparatively speaking, by traditional Chinese historiography and overshadowed by the “orthodox” (正统) Shang dynasty until the modern discovery of the Sanxingdui site. Thus, it is evident that not only are individuals from subaltern classes neglected in historiography, but also entire regimes and cultures that flourished for several centuries.

A similar example would be the Western Xia dynasty whose history was not officially compiled by the subsequent Yuan dynasty. This was unlike the Liao, Song and Jin dynasties that were given “orthodox” status by the Yuan court and therefore had their official histories compiled by a team led by the Yuan official Toqto’a. As a result, the history of the Western Xia dynasty was pretty much lost to time until the re-discovery of the Western Xia imperial mausoleums in Ningxia in the 1930s, after which ignited the interests of historians on this dynasty that lasted for 189 years.

As the examples above serve to illustrate, traditional Chinese historiography tends to emphasise the political and cultural significance of the “Central Plain dynasties” (中原王朝) and “great unified dynasties” (大一统王朝) — regimes often considered to be “orthodox” by traditional Chinese historians — at the expense of the “lesser” contemporaneous regimes that are frequently relegated to the status of “localised regimes” (割据政权). This is despite the fact that some of the “localised regimes” were not necessarily less advanced in terms of culture, technology, economic development, and/or military strength, when compared to their “orthodox” counterparts. The Western Xia dynasty, for instance, defeated the “orthodox” Northern Song dynasty on numerous occasions, notably at the Battle of Sanchuankou (三川口之战) and the Battle of Haoshuichuan (好水川之战) that took place soon after the Western Xia dynasty was established.

The fact is that history was (and still is) written by the victors and those in positions of power, to the detriment of those “marginalised”. This is not unique to China, but is certainly something that affects our holistic understanding of history as a whole. Hence, it is unfortunate that we may never get an absolutely holistic understanding of Chinese history, especially considering its long history, the vast number of historical regimes and ethnicities, and the large geographical area associated with the politico-cultural realm of “China”. Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the Chinese  (including Han and non-Han peoples) have maintained a long tradition of history writing, as we can see in the form of the “orthodox” Twenty-Four Histories (二十四史) and various other historical texts that could shed light on Chinese history and beyond.

Having considered the above, this thus begs the question of whether the historiographical importance (or the lack thereof) assigned to certain regimes is well justified, and how could historians remain objective in their research and analysis on the “lesser” regimes without being influenced by traditional historiographical views?

Hi Alvin

Thanks for the well-detailed and ironed out response! Really enjoyed your comments. I would just like to respond to your point that ” the idea of “China” and “Chinese” were largely based on culture and identity, and less on ethnicity per se”. Is ethnicity not about cultures and identities as well? For instance, do we not associate celebrating Chinese New Year with being Chinese? Indeed, I am merely nuancing the point that ethnicity as a concept in itself is difficult to unpack, and changes its definition over time. Across time, various scholars have found different ways to conceptualise ethnicity, with the main schools being primordialism/essentialism, which believes there is a core essence of ethnic identity (what you seem to suggest here), instrumentalism, which believes ethnic can be manipulated by an actor to achieve economic/political gain (e.g the Qing or other “barbarian” dynasties adopting Chinese customs and becoming Chinese), and constructivism, which takes the longue duree, and shows how structures interact to mould/change ethnic identity over time.

So fundamentally, I would not say that the idea of being Chinese was less on ethnicity, but rather, the concept of ethnicity changed over time. While this module is about imperial China, allow me to extrapolate to the time of the late Qing, when revolutionary sentiments were formenting. Prior to this time, the idea of ethnicity was mallaeble, as seen by the sinification of the Qing royals. However, race theory from the West emerged during this time, leading to sharp “us” vs “them” distinctions. This has also affected the Chinese conception of ethnicity and race, and can be observed in the change of one of Sun Yat Sen’s Three People’s Principles sanminzhuyi 三民主义, which came to be the ruling ideology of Republican China. The principle in question was People’s Nationalism or minzhu 民族, which originally set out for a nationalism based on harmonious relations with ethnic minorities e.g Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and the Muslims against foreign imperialists. However, with the emergence of race theory, Sun’s principle began to take a racist and ethnocentrist flavour, as it became increasingly anti-Manchu and pro-Han. There were increasing calls for the overthrow of the barbarian Manchus and restoration of the Han.

To conclude, ethnicity is not an easy concept to unpack. I think one good book that discusses this in the context of modern China is Frank Dikotter’s The Discourse of Race in Modern China. I am unsure of any for the imperial period, so do let me know if anyone knows any!

Hi Clarence, thanks for your insightful response.

I think the way I phrased my sentence might have been slightly confusing. By “the idea of ‘Chinese’ was less on ethnicity per se”, I meant that being born to a certain “race” did not necessarily define someone as strictly “Chinese” or “barbarian”. In other words, predetermined blood relations was not the primary factor that determined the “Chinese” identity, in both political and cultural sense. In hindsight, I think that the term “race” (种族) might have been a better choice than “ethnicity” (民族), as the former denotes biological differences while the latter generally has cultural connotations.

As you have rightly pointed out, the idea of “Chinese” and “ethnicity” evolved over time. Both the Han and non-Han peoples in historical China played significant roles in shaping the definition and identity of “China” and “Chinese”. Just as dynasties that were ruled by ethnic Han often considered dynasties ruled by non-Han peoples as “barbarian”, the latter frequently attempted to position themselves as part of “China”, which was often redefined by non-Han groups as more of a multicultural and multiethnic realm as opposed to a “China of exclusively ethnic Han” (in a similar vein as Lee Kuan Yew’s advocation for a “Malaysian Malaysia”). At various points in time, certain dynasties ruled by non-Han ethnicities even considered dynasties founded by ethnic Han to be “barbarian” and denied their political legitimacy. One such example would be the Northern and Southern dynasties period, whereby the series of Northern dynasties (all except the Northern Qi dynasty were ruled by ethnic Xianbei) referred to their southern counterparts as “insular barbarians” (岛夷), while the Southern dynasties (all were ruled by ethnic Han) labelled their northern counterparts as “barbarians with braided hair” (索虏).

It is also interesting to note that the ethnic group that we call “Han” was not (and is not) a homogeneous group from a biological (racial) perspective. Yet this group of diverse people identifies themselves as “Han” due to their shared identity based largely on the “Han” culture.

Adding on to your point on the “nationalism” clause in the Three Principles of the People, I think the absolute view that the principle was “pro-Han” and “anti-Manchu” risks missing out on the nuances. Whereas it is true that the slogan “Expel the Tatar barbarians and restore China” (驱除鞑虏，恢复中华) attained popularity towards the end of the Qing dynasty, there was another dimension to this “Han-centric ethnic nationalism” that is often overlooked. In 1906, Sun Yat-sen mentioned in a speech that “We do not hate the Manchu people, but rather the Manchu people who harmed the Han people” (我们并不是恨满洲人，是恨害汉人的满洲人). To put it differently, the “hatred” was aimed at a very specific group of Manchus, particularly those of the Aisin Gioro imperial clan and ethnic Manchu elites who served in the Qing court deemed to have jeopardised the interests of the ethnic Han. This nuanced nature of the ideology could also serve to explain why it was possible to shift towards a multicultural and multiethnic Chinese nationalism in the form of the “Five Races Under One Union” (五族共和) upon the establishment of the Republic of China (apart from pragmatic concerns over territorial sovereignty).

I hope this clarifies the ambiguity that my original phrasing might have caused. I have slightly modified my original response to address the issue.

Agreed. Adding on, I’m going by Shaoyun Yang The Way of the Barbarians, Nicolas Tackett the Origins of the Chinese nation: To address the problem with the concept of civilisation. Yang pointed out that the “civilisation”  (文明)  and “cultured” (文化) were virtually unknown expressions in premodern Chinese (before the influx of Meiji Japanese translations of Western concepts) and carried a different meaning, while the more common concept of “civility” (文) was not even exalted as an ideal; Confucius and many others warned against excess of such civility/sophistication. The distinguishing factor between Chinese and the barbarians was solely attributed to Moral Propriety (禮). Adherents of one particular ideology believing that their system of ethics is superior to other value systems is not unique to China; it is not even uncommon, hence the culture wars of today. This does not support the idea of ethnoculturally (however that is defined) based definitions of Chineseness playing a significant role in the narrative writing of Chinese historiography.

Until the Northern Song dynasty, the concept of Chineseness was based on adherence to the Chinese moral order: this seems to be similar to the Roman concept of Romanitas of a Roman moral order (which did not preclude ethnic differences) that was subsequently conflated with conversion to Christianity. It was only in rejection to the An Lushan rebellion and the Jurchen occupation, the authors argue, that some Chinese suggested that alien bloodlines were inherently deficient in their ability to fulfill the moral order, thus popularising the distinction between all Chinese 華 and Han Chinese 漢, bringing an end to Tang era cosmopolitanism. This would help one to distinguish the chain of thought of 2nd millenium China from the preceding periods, but yet Central plains-centric historiography was firmly in place by this time.

Even the use of the concept of “culture” may be a little misleading as it implies some element of longstanding custom and heritage (e.g. Chinese New Year) which is significantly less fluid than the historical reality, in which one could very well become Chinese simply – by analogy – as the Franks could become in a way Roman after they adopted Roman Catholicism (this justification continued through the history of Germany). After all Sanping, Chen, in Succession Struggle and the Ethnic Identity of the Tang Imperial House, relates how the Tang imperial family maintained many Xianbei customs yet were, and are, not referred to as barbarians, demonstrating the generally weak demarcation to the concept of barbarism.

adding to @Suyi

Furthermore, the usual Chinese word for “barbarian” (夷) did not carry the same strongly negative connotation as the English translation. The Han era texts Yuejueshu and Shuowen Jiezi state that the word is associated with benevolence and was related to the word for ‘the sea’ in the Baiyue language. As late as the Opium Wars, Chinese officials vehemently denied to British envoys that this word was meant to be anything but a neutral word for foreigners. In addition: the Qin state was denounced as “barbarian” by the Central Plains states, while the Han dynasty court culture was based on that of the Chu state, which had also been called “barbarian” by the Central Plains states (Constance, Cook, Defining Chu), yet their legacy was commemorated nonetheless.

@clarence

Ultimately I would assert that the Sanxingdui culture, and perhaps even more important, the Liangzhu culture in the Yangtze Delta, was dismissed not out of a disdain for their supposed ‘barbarism’ or illiteracy but rather out of the simple political expediency that the memory of multiple power centres was an inconvenient fact jarring with the process of state formation and nation building. This hostility to past division was very visible in the founding of the Qin dynasty, which eradicated the Mohists for suggesting that all states should be equal and independent of each other, and the Song dynasty, which took great care to attack the rulers of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms who formed diplomatic relations with each other on terms of equality; “sharing the mandate of Heaven” (Tackett), as it contradicted the Song dynasty’s desire to reunify the former territories of the preceding dynasties (漢唐舊疆). If China had not been repeatedly reunified, there would naturally have been a heavy focus on regional civilisations in search of national mythmaking for each of these provincial polities. The surging focus on Taiwanese aborigines despite comprising a negligible portion of the population may also be attributed to the drive for this national legitimitation.

The framing of Chinese history as in the traditional dynastic chronicles is certainly clouded by the moralistic tendency of the Confucian intelligentsia, and this does deserve more attention.

@ Samuel: Wow!!! I have honestly never expected that students in this class already know so well about the ongoing debate among intellectual historians (especially Tackett and Yang) on “China,” Chineseness,” as well as the cultural and ethnic dimensions of these terms in the Tang and Song dynasties. Only for graduate seminars, I would assign their books!

Indeed, like the old Chinese saying goes, “The younger generation will surpass the older! 后生可畏！” I am truly amazed by so many of you! Bravo!

Hi Alvin, great examples of the Shu state and the Xi Xia dynasty! In the past couple of decades, historians have deepened our understanding of such political entities that had been traditionally marginalized in the orthodox Chinese historiography, thanks to the rise of sub-disciplines like social history, cultural history, and local history as well as the discovery of new sources. Nonetheless, comparing to the traditional “great unified dynasties,” historical sources for such marginalized regimes are still limited. Your last question is valid. Some modern historians are indeed occasionally influenced by the traditional historiographical views that certainly have biases, but it is less an issue now comparing to decades ago. The imperial China history field has advanced far beyond the conventional approach that focuses exclusively on “Central Plain dynasties” or takes a state-oriented top-down perspective.

@ Clarence: Good question! Meanwhile, the categories of “civilized” and “uncivilized” are subjective ones, depending on who are making the standards. Same in the past, same now. Thus, a further interesting question we can think is what the people who created the Sanxiingdui civilization thought about themselves and the Others. Is there a way for us to know their views without written records but only material objects left by them?

I would like to thank my classmates for the interesting and insightful discussion. I’ve learned a lot from reading about the discussions. To answer Prof’s question, I feel that while it is possible for us to learn about the Sanxingdui people through the material objects left by them, we will never be able to truly know their views without the written records. Without the written records, we can only speculate based on the artifacts left behind by them. In the documentary, it was clear that there were still many mysteries surrounding the people of Sanxingdui despite the various artefacts unearthed. While we can try and deduce who they are and their views based on the historical surroundings at that time and records left over by others, unless we have written records by them, we would not be able to confirm their own views. I suppose this also highlights the importance of written records to a civilization.

I would also like to highlight how I am fascinated by the workmanship of the artifacts. If I am not wrong, the video pointed how one of the carvings were so refined that it could only be reproduced using laser today. How then, did people in the past with their limited technologies be able to reproduce such refined works?

Hi Prof and friends of HY2206,

Thank you for the very insightful and nuanced posts in the forum, I thoroughly enjoyed reading all of them and definitely have my own takeaways!

Regarding prof’s question on whether there is a way for us to know their views through looking at the material objects left by them, I was wondering if the use of gold could also possibly suggest the (thought-to-be) superior status of the people from the Sanxingdui civilisation? Since the idea of gold has often been associated with emperorship, the use of gold in large volume, in my opinion, definitely meant something. I was rather surprised that gold, a material so rare and high in value, are used in such means to create the gold-gilded mask found in Sanxingdui.

Furthermore, even in the Shang dynasty, masks were rarely made as they were often products of belief or symbols of power. Yet, in the Sanxingdui excavation, we can find gold-gilded mask. Perhaps these 2 ideas in combination could suggest something about how people who created the Sanxingdui civilisation thought about themselves and others?

I think thats a good way to look at it – the material composition and quality of the different masks may indicate different social standings in their POV, and from that we may identify the “foreigner”. However, given the sheer expensiveness of Gold, it is more likely that the mask was intended for the uppermost crust of their society rather than an indication of how they saw themselves as ‘superior’ to the ‘others’.

Another way I would see it, is based on how the masks are designed: despite the “alien” looking nature of those masks, there almost a sort of “normal” of certain common characteristics (big eyes, wing-like eyes, wide smiles) that are replicated throughout. Perhaps, this would indicate the ‘average’ or ‘baseline’ of the Sanxingdui peoples. Then, a few masks had particularly exaggerated features, such as an odd and vertically-elongated nose. This may be indicative of certain physical stereotypes of other peoples, perhaps part of Sanxingdui’s society, or maybe this was how they saw certain groups of foreigners. Furthermore, we need to be sensitive to the arrangement and space where these masks are found: Further archeological digs in the near-future, may help identify a certain purpose to the way these masks were arranged and stored.

Then again, these are all guesses from someone with near-zero knowledge in archeology. These masks, like all art, tend to be interpreted subjectively to the viewer’s preference – who knows what the original artist intended? Maybe they were a society that saw themselves as lesser to the Chinese, or maybe accorded such friendliness that the gold-glided mask actually represents their Chinese envoys. We are dependent on written language or oral accounts to establish some sort of linguistic ‘common ground’ to understand the basic beliefs of another people (especially those from an ancient past) in order to then interpret their material legacies.

There was a segment in the documentary, however, of the indigenous Sanxingdui dance that still thrives today. Is this dance a direct descendant from the original Sanxingdui culture? If so, or even if just a tribute based on oral folklore and beliefs, we may derive more meaning from the masks once they turn dynamic in the visual performances. A look into similar masked dances in the region may also help provide more clues to how the Sanxingdui peoples of the past envisioned the characters of the masks they crafted, and thus a very tiny glimpse into their minds towards the Chinese, their ‘other’.

I recall a military historian CJ Peers suggested that the rise of the shi 士 class of warriors during the Shang dynasty as an aristocracy was linked to their knowledge of bronze metallurgy which helped them to manufacture superior weapons. Possibly related to this, or as a result, Chinese dynasties from prehistory right up until modern times have a strong ceremonial emphasis on bronze ritual objects especially the cauldron 鼎 as emblems of authority. The large scale production of bronze masks and sculpture in Sanxingdui may be analogous to this social stratification in the Shang culture. Maybe the ability to master the newly invented bronzeworking and possibly also goldsmithing technology elevated a segment of the population into a leadership role in society as it gave them a decisive military and economic edge over everyone else in the similar way to the tech gurus of today?

Hi all, the responses here are really insightful. I would like to add on to the arguments of Benedict and Samuel.

I believe the bronze artifacts found in the Sanxingdui site might point to a tradition of ancestor veneration practised by the people of Shu (the ancient state of which the Sanxingdui site is generally associated with). It is notable that some of the masks discovered in the site feature “alien-looking” designs, most significantly the protruding eyes. As some scholars have proposed, these masks with protruding eyes could have been based on the appearance of Cancong (蚕丛), the alleged founder of Shu. As per the “Records of Shu” (蜀志) of the Chronicles of Huayang (华阳国志), “The Marquis of Shu, Cancong, whose eyes were protruded, was the first to proclaim himself king” (有蜀侯蚕丛，其目纵，始称王). In this sense, masks with various other designs could also have been based on other important figures in their history. The creation of masks based on their founding monarch (and other ancestral figures) thus suggests that the people of Sanxingdui were at least concerned with honouring the dead, as did their counterparts in the Central Plain. The state of Shu existed during the period of Bronze Age in China, hence the bronze artifacts unearthed likely represented the most advanced form of metallurgy mastered by the inhabitants of the time. Given this context, crafting an object that was supposed to be a representation of their founding monarch (and other significant individuals) out of the most advanced technology they had would make logical sense.

As Samuel has suggested, bronze ritual objects like the tripod cauldron were accorded symbolic meanings, mostly political ones. Historically, the number of cauldrons an individual could possess had to follow a strict rule that symbolised their position within a strictly defined political hierarchy: the Son of Heaven could have nine, vassal rulers could have seven, ministers of state could have five, and individuals of the gentry class could have three or one. The nine tripod cauldrons of the Son of Heaven, in particular, symbolised the traditional Nine Provinces (九州) of China. The political importance assigned to tripod cauldrons is further evident by the idiom “to inquire of the cauldrons” (问鼎中原), in which the King Zhuang of Chu asked about the weight of the tripod cauldrons possessed by the King Ding of Zhou, and has come to mean an ambition to seize political power. As an extension of the symbolic meaning of the cauldrons, a Chinese expression for establishing a capital city is “定鼎”. These highly symbolic political meanings associated with bronzewares in the Central Plain might had also influenced the people of Sanxingdui, such that they believed it was only logical and appropriate that objects depicting their founding monarch (and other ancestral figures) were to be made of bronze, the most advanced form of metallurgy they mastered.

Excellent discussions! The comparison between the Shang and the Sanxingdui cultures presents a perfect example for the significance of the written script for an early human civilization. While we could only suggest whether Sanxingdui people made the masks to worship their ancestors or gods, we could make definitive conclusions with the Shang case once we decipher the oracle-bone script and differentiate words that refer to higher powers like “Di 帝” from those to ancestors like “Fu 父.”