When Nationalism and Orientalism Coincide:
Reading History and Culture in Emirati Schoolbooks
Rana AlMutawa
St. Antony’s College,
University of Oxford, UK
rana.almutawa@sant.ox.ac.uk
My Emirati relatives still refer to the Emirati dirham as a “rupee;” my friends still do a henna night whenever one of them gets married, and we still cook biryani at home, using spices that were introduced from India. Although our lives are intertwined, connections to the Indian Ocean world are often downplayed (Onley 2007, 2004; Patrick 2012). The Arab Gulf associates itself with the Arab world, not with South Asia, which it often views as inferior. By neglecting the stories, histories and cultures from the Indian Ocean, the Arab Gulf depicts itself as purely Arab and Bedouin — contrary to its reality (Onley 2007, AlMutawa 2016). This article argues that abandoning the reality of the Indian Ocean influence on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) creates local representations of Emirati culture that are monolithic and ahistorical — similar to Western Orientalist depictions of Emirati society. Through a critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 2003) of high school national education textbooks in the UAE, I will show how the UAE aims to create an imagined community with one shared history and culture. Through standardizing local culture and avoiding the non-Arab influences in it, social reproductions begin to portray Emirati history and culture similarly to the way Western Orientalists do — purely Arab and Bedouin, monolithic and ahistorical.
Introduction
Lugaimat, abayas and the yola are typical images that are used to represent ‘traditional’ Emirati life. Such images are thematic in social reproductions, ingraining a certain idyllic but ahistorical image of culture in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (AlMutawa 2016a, 2016b). Although various local histories (and symbols) exist in the region, they are often ignored in social reproductions, with the Bedouin narrative dominating the story of the Emirates. Yet outside these social reproductions, the UAE and the wider Arab Gulf is multidimensional and diverse. The Arab Gulf has had a transnational population for thousands of years, and local cultures are so intermingled with Indian Ocean neighbors that it is difficult to pinpoint whether some Gulf families are Persianized Arabs or Arabized Persians (Onley 2005, 2007). Many pearl-divers were originally East African, and traditional Arab sea-faring songs are actually African-inspired (Bilkhair 2006).
Domestic nation-building efforts in the UAE depict national history and culture as uniform and ahistorical, with stark similarities to the monolithic society of desert Arabs that Orientalists imagined. Although nationalism and Orientalism do not always coincide, they certainly do so in many of the Arab Gulf States, and possibly beyond. The UAE is a young country and is a federation of seven emirates that united in 1971 (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaima, which joined in 1972). The union of different emirates places extra pressure on the state to promote national cohesion and create an imagined community with one homogenous history and culture. This paper will thus demonstrate that the official UAE narrative of a pure Arab, Bedouin Emirati society homogenizes and marginalizes Emirati history and culture in a way that, ironically, ends up resembling Orientalist representations of the region. Examples of this emerge from a critical discourse analysis of high school national education textbooks from the UAE Ministry of Education (MOE), which were used for the development of this paper.
The paper’s propositions are two-fold: First, to create national cohesion with a shared history and culture, the UAE government invents traditions that depict a pure, Arab Bedouin narrative—one that excludes the Ajami, Baluch, East-African, Sufi, and other ethnic and religious groups. Formal power structures also play a role in this marginalization. Many rulers of the UAE trace their roots back to Bedouin tribal leaders, thereby making such perceptions of Emirati identity dominant. Similarly, Abu Dhabi is the most influential emirate in the UAE, and its predominantly Bedouin heritage is more dominant in national representations than, for example, the cultures of the mountain tribes in Ras Al Khaimah. Second, through the homogenization that comes with nation-building, Emirati history and culture appears ahistorical and monolithic, coinciding with Western Orientalist representations of the region. Thus, using national education schoolbooks, this research investigates the way Emirati history, culture and identity is promoted in the UAE, as well as the similarities these representations share with Orientalist images of this society.
Background
Similar to many national education textbooks in other parts of the world, the aim of national education in the UAE is to promote loyalty to the state, to instill national pride, and to build students’ knowledge about their country (General Framework for Curriculum KPI’s 2014). To begin with, however, I note a few variations between the UAE (and to some extent the other GCC states) and their ethnic minorities in comparison to other countries. In nations such as the United States, France, and Turkey, for instances, national citizens of minority groups have often endured structural racism and violence, such as that historically directed against African Americans in the U.S. or against Kurds in Turkey. However, the ethnic and religious diversity in the UAE does not translate to similar dynamics, especially as the naturalization of citizens is not very common. Emirati citizens from African, Persian, or Baluch backgrounds have resided in the UAE before the discovery of oil. There are generally no disparities in wealth or even influence between them (possibly with exceptions of key military positions). There is generally a complete mix of Emirati ethnic groups within schools, neighborhoods, and offices. However, this is not to say there is no social variance—some Arab tribes might refuse to marry their daughters to men of Ajami or Baluch backgrounds, and there is still racism in terms of the idea that fairer features are more beautiful than black features.
Many of the Ajami, Baluch, and East African (as well as Indian) influences on the local culture of the UAE are part of Emirati history and culture today, for they have become part of everyday life. For example, words of Persian and Indian origin are used daily in khaleeji dialect by Emiratis of all ethnic groups (Beeman 2010). The difference is that they are removed from context and the original non-Arab influence is rarely mentioned. Therefore, in many cases, what can be construed as minority cultures are not distinct from the dominant culture; they are one and the same, but awareness of their historical origins is lacking and ignored. This correlates to what Bilkhair (2006) described in her research on African sea songs, which she asserted are depicted as Arab, without any referral of their East African influence. However, there are still distinct cultural variants between Emiratis of different ethnic backgrounds, such as the speaking of Ajami rather than Arabic at home among some Ajami Emirati families.
Making matters more complicated is the lesser examined issue of the way Bedouins are sometimes considered to represent cultural backwardness, rather than superiority, to some people in the Arab Gulf (this is especially prevalent in Kuwait). While Bedouins are sometimes considered as culturally backwards, the perception of their superior ethnicity is shared by most khaleejis. As has been described in previous studies (Onley 2005; 2007; Kanna 2011), the Bedouin narrative remains privileged, a narrative endorsed even by non-Bedouin khaleejis.
Literature Review
Anderson (1991) argued that nationalism is fostered through socially constructed ‘imagined communities,’ where citizens who may have never physically met still imagine themselves as part of one community with a shared history and culture. This process of nation-building also involves inventing traditions, as Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) termed them. They argue that traditions that seem old are often actually recent or invented and are created to ‘establish continuity with a suitable historic past’ (1). For example, in the UAE, the invention of camel-racing as a national sport promotes the Arab Bedouin historical narrative (Khalaf 2000). Invented traditions are disseminated through different forms of social reproductions, including schoolbooks, which Gellner (1983) maintains are vital vehicles for spreading nationalism.
In the UAE, invented traditions promote a narrative of an Arab past that dismisses the diversity of the region (Khalaf 2000), therefore essentializing it, stripping its stories of their context, and reducing it to monolithic and ahistorical accounts. The above represent the very accusations Said (1978) leveled against Orientalists such as Gibb, whom he charged to seem ‘entirely comfortable with the idea of a monolithic East, whose existential circumstances cannot easily be reduced to race or racial theory’ (278). Similarly, Said (1978) reproached Lewis for delivering ‘ahistorical and willful political assertions in the form of scholarly argument’ (location 6875).
Caton (1999, 188) and Abu-Lughod (1990, 94-102) discussed the way Arab societies are often depicted as segmentary in anthropology, with images of romanticized and fiercely independent Bedouin men or of tribal violence and mayhem. Western scholars, journalists and writers often refer to the segmentary lineage system when discussing Gulf societies: Images of deserts and Bedouin tribes (sometime juxtaposed to skyscrapers when describing life in Dubai or Doha today) are often used to describe the Gulf. For example, social anthropologist Miriam Cooke (2014) chided the Gulf States for erasing their ‘rich, multicultural history,’ citing the marginalization of Ajami khaleejis, as well as merchants, from national narrative that privileges ‘desert tribes’ (30-49). Yet, she engaged in the very marginalization that she critiqued through her own descriptions of Gulf Arabs. Of khaleejis, Cooke (2014) asserts,
These women in black and men in white are the scions of tribes who knew no roof but the sky and the goat-hair tent. From pre-Islamic times, poets sang a life of travel from oasis to oasis, where they named each dune according to its shape and resilience, each stage in a camel’s life, and each shade of its hair. (6)
In 1978, Said argued that ‘[There are] cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could be said about them in the West’ (5). However, some Arabs accept the simplistic, Orientalist depictions of themselves: Salamandra (2005) noted that the greatest demand for Orientalist art comes from Arabs, particularly Gulf Arabs. Similarly, Emiratis’ endorsement of monolithic and ahistorical images of a pure Arab society extend to Emiratis of Ajami or Baluch backgrounds: A social commentator wrote about encountering many Ajami and Baluch origin Emiratis who changed their last names to sound more Arab (Al-Qassemi 2016). Similarly, Onley (2005) quoted Easa al-Gurg, former UAE Ambassador to the UK, who espoused similar depictions of a purely Arab culture when describing his own heritage. Al-Gurg described his family’s relation to Lingah, a city in present-day Iran, by saying:
My immediate forebears were pearl merchants and landowners and enjoyed the products of that life abundantly. The distinctly Arab character of Lingah and of my own background is evidenced by the fact that every one of these deeds is in Arabic, not Persian. (Onley 2005, 62)
Gellner (1983) defined nationalism as the imposition of a ‘high’ culture on a ‘low culture’: the former being the modern, standardized national culture and the latter being the informal, local, folk culture. Diffusion of culture through a common education system is one of the hallmarks of a ‘high’ culture through which nationalism is disseminated, promoted, maintained, and sustained. Indeed, such cases have been reported in schoolbooks in different parts of the world, wherein these textbooks aim to standardize the local cultures. Nasser (2004) observed that the Jordanian school textbooks promote an identity that is so restrictive that the majority of the Jordanian population of Palestinian origin is ignored in textbook representations. A similar situation is found in an analysis of Turkish textbooks, which clearly promote a Central Asian, Sunni-Muslim identity (Çayır 2015). By denying a discussion of the other histories and cultures that exist within these nations, these textbook representations promote a standardized and rigid interpretation of history.
When national identity is being created through media and print-capitalism, certain dialects become privileged over others, leading to the ‘fatality of linguistic diversity’ (Anderson 1991, 43). Power structures play a role in determining which dialects survive and which die out – the ones that survive are the ones that the state selects to be represented in media, print-capitalism, and social reproductions. Similarly, power structures play a role in promoting and privileging certain national narratives over others. Among the seven emirates of the UAE, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are the most influential, respectively. Abu Dhabi society is more tribal than Dubai’s, with more families of Bedouin origin. The Bedouin narrative is also the dominant narrative (Onley 2005, 2007; Patrick 2012). The narrative of seafarers (many of whom are from Dubai) also holds a strong place in local historical accounts, but its transnational nature is often ignored or misrepresented as purely Arab (Bilkhair 2006). Meanwhile, the less powerful regions (or groups), such as the Emiratis from the mountains of Ras Al Khaimah, or the Sufis, are rarely represented in national narratives. Power structures also include the rulers themselves, many of whom tie their roots to a Bedouin past (Kanna 2011, location 1457, 1640, 1649, 3083). These narratives of a Bedouin past re-assert the legitimacy of the rulers and the power structures that be. The homogenizing effects of these power structures, therefore, also contribute to a discourse that is rigid and uniform, coinciding with Orientalist depictions of ‘Eastern’ societies.
Methodology
I employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze high school national education textbooks (grades 9-12) published by the UAE Ministry of Education. CDA takes the surrounding context and environment of the text into consideration, allowing for a more thorough and holistic analysis. CD analysts state that scholarly discourse is part of existing social structure and, therefore, should be studied within the context of the environment in which scholarly discourse exists (Van Dijk 2003, 352-371). Van Dijk (2003) explained that amongst other requirements, CDA is focused on social and political issues; it is used to investigate how discourse reproduces relations of power in society, and is expected to expound in detail rather than just describe discourse structures. CDA is therefore useful in understanding the politics and ideologies that are at the backbone of the written messages in national education textbooks. This means that CDA is not only used to analyze what is written in the textbooks, but also what is absent (Nasser 2004).
The Ministry of Education (MOE) books are used in all public schools (except the Abu Dhabi schools, as they use Abu Dhabi Education Council books) and most private school grades. Therefore, most Emirati students use these books to study about the UAE. This research only analyzes 2015 national education books as no older versions were available at the ministry or from archival sources. The textbooks I analyzed were recently in use either in standard or piloted formats: Grades 10 and 11 were using piloted textbooks, and grades 9 and 12 were using the standard textbooks. No other versions of these textbooks existed for these grades during the time this research was being conducted. I chose high school books specifically because I expected them to have the most sophisticated and detailed discussions of identity, culture, and history in the UAE and, therefore, to provide greater nuance and detail.
Textbook Findings and Discussion
The analysis showed that these textbooks often stressed national identity as an essential aspect of life. The books imply that a ‘loss of national identity’ is imminent if one does not hold on to the narrowly defined interpretation of identity, asserting,
If national identity is essential for proving existence, it is also necessary for creativity, progress and development. Those who do not have a national identity, or ignore it, or belittle it remained marginalized, with no value to them, and no role for them in human civilizations. (Social Studies and National Education for Grade 11 2015, 47)
The textbooks commonly refer to the Emirati identity as being purely Arab and Bedouin or aseel. The textbooks strive to make the UAE sound homogeneous in a manner similar to what Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1983) suggest occurs through the education systems that are used to disseminate a standardized nationalism. In particular, the high culture (of the tribal, Arab, Bedouin) is the standardized, national culture found in textbooks and other state social reproductions, and the low culture (of the Ajamis, Baluchs, and Africans) is a folk culture relegated to informal settings such as in the home and at family celebrations. The dominance of this high culture supports a single narrative of the UAE that becomes representative of Emiratis of different backgrounds, as seen by al-Gurg’s statement in the literature review. This narrative coincides with Orientalist depictions of the region that project it as monolithic and purely Arab, with unchanging cultures and traditions.
For example, in a grade 10 textbook, a chapter discusses the characteristics that made the Emirati union successful. The paragraph describes Emiratis, including those from different emirates, to be homogeneous in characteristics, customs, traditions, and lifestyles:
As a result of the lack of geographical boundaries separating the children of the UAE, there is a social, political, and economic homogeneity… with the use of the same language and the similar ways of thinking that is reflected in the traditions of the people and the nation and its culture which is different from other countries… On top of that, the nation holds a glorious spiritual union that the true Islamic religion adds to its cultural character, with the presence of a high degree of homogeneity in social institutions, spearheaded by culture and traditions, and the reign of pure, Arab values of generosity, bravery, loyalty and strong family ties. (Social Studies and National Education for Grade 10 2015, 10) [Emphasis added]
The stress on the pure (‘aseel’) Arab narrative is common in social reproductions in the UAE. The textbooks’ portrayals of pure Arabness as equivalent to being an Emirati are not particularly different from referrals made by Westerners who confuse being an Emirati with being a Bedouin. For example, in The Guardian, Love (2013) wrote, ‘Until this year, only the local Bedouins were allowed to own property in Dubai, and even now every company has to be at least 51 per cent owned by a local. It keeps the accountants busy – and the Bedouins rich.’ For Love, being an Emirati is synonymous to being a Bedouin—an inaccurate and Orientalist attitude that the UAE textbooks themselves promote. Whether the UAE is representing its culture in this manner is also due to Western influence and their Orientalist depictions of the region is a subject for another paper.
As the textbook’s quote suggests, there is some degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity among the different emirates, and the populations within them. Similar lifestyles, history, culture and traditions must have also played a role in the stability of the union. However, heterogeneity does exist within these populations, both among the emirates and among the same populations of each emirate; yet this is not reflected in the textbooks. Dubai, for example, has been a city associated with trade and migration since before the oil boom, specifically in its relations with its Indian Ocean neighbors. Today, it is still the emirate with the largest number of foreign workers, and is considered the most liberal emirate. Compared to Dubai, Abu Dhabi was more insular and conservative, with a larger Bedouin population, which is reflected in a more tribal society. In addition to the mix of differences among each emirate, ethnic diversity exists among Emiratis within the same emirate. Although this heterogeneity can be a positive attribute, the schoolbooks imply that heterogeneity is to be understood as an exclusively negative attribute by stating that it is homogeneity that has made the union successful and, thus, that heterogeneity would make it unstable.
To promote the image of a homogenous Emirati culture, these textbooks often make statements claiming that the presence of immigrants did not cause any changes to local society. Immigrants are identified as arriving only after the union of the emirates in 1971, implying that immigration is a very recent occurrence that has not affected the perceived deeply rooted local cultures and traditions. There is no reference to the transnational local society or the foreigners who played significant roles in the region’s economy before the oil boom, such as the Indians who controlled a large part of the gold market and who acted as the region’s bankers before the introduction of formal banks (Onley 2014). The textbook reads,
UAE society, although including 200 different nationalities, did not become a multicultural society, nor was there a fusion of cultures, and the different cultures remained without affecting the local culture. This is because it resulted in a situation specific to that of Emirati society, which we may term as a cultural mix. (Social Studies and National Education for Grade 10 2015, 11).
The book makes note of the more recent influx of different nationalities in the UAE, which occurred after the discovery of oil, ignoring the immigration that occurred pre-oil. Migrants do not usually gain citizenship after having settled in the UAE, as they would in certain Western states, and their interaction with Emiratis is limited, denoting that it is possible that Emirati culture is not affected by immigration to some extent. However, it is far-fetched to claim that foreign migrants did not at all affect the local culture, and to ignore the historical facts of immigration that occurred prior to the union of the UAE.
In another article, I found similar examples of the re-invention of history in other social reproductions, such as in the website of the Mleiha archeological sites in Sharjah, which has sites dating back 130,000 years (AlMutawa 2016a). Mleiha’s website describes ancient Mleiha as traditionally Emirati and Bedouin, telling its visitors to ‘experience the history of traditional Emirati life’ and to ‘uncover the secrets of the region’s ancient Bedouin culture.’ Yet, these sites from the Palaeolithic period are neither ‘traditional Emirati’ nor representative of ‘Bedouin culture’ (AlMutawa 2016a). Again, the UAE is depicted as having one standard culture and tradition set for the region’s entire known history. This conforms to Orientalist depictions of the Gulf, which project a similar image of a monolithic and ahistorical East that is never-changing. In the case of the UAE, this depiction is of unchanging and deeply rooted desert Arab traditions.
These particular perceptions of identity found in the textbooks are strongly accepted within Emirati society. Even those who are aware of local cultural diversity endorse the standardization promoted by the state. Onley (2005) described this in his research on transnational khaleejis, where he noted that Gulf citizens of Persian backgrounds aim to downplay their transnational heritage. Their accounts echo the very statements made in the schoolbooks examined here. In this regard, Onley quoted Kanoo,
In the Gulf, we are more of a mixing pot than a melting pot since each racial identity still keeps true to itself even after years of interacting together …We still retain our own identity, which makes us unique … So while I am likely to know Hindi or Farsi and enjoy the foods, customs, and celebrations of their peoples, I am still an Arab of the Gulf and that will always be true of me (49).
Therefore, the high culture of the Arab-origin Emiratis has become the standard, nationalist culture, even for those with transnational backgrounds. The textbook statements do not differ much from those of the Western researcher, who said, ‘So are Emirati youth drifting more toward the Western, heterogeneous urban society and away from their homogeneous roots?’ (Titzer 2014, 6). According to Titzer, it is Western society which is heterogenous, and local society which is monolithic—a view promoted by the UAE and most Gulf States themselves.
Yet there are contradictions in these books, ones which claim that foreign culture is rapidly changing society and affecting traditions. Indeed, the textbooks make opposing claims: (a) that foreigners have not affected the pure, local culture and (b) that the foreigners are responsible for damaging the nation’s pure culture and are a threat to it. The following description details the ‘most pressing social issues in the UAE’:
There is an increase in foreign maids’ and nannies’ influence on young children while the parents are busy. These maids and nannies come to the country with their own culture, their own ways of raising children common in their countries. They transmit their language, rituals, ideas, values and actions, which are different than that of the Emirati society, to the child. Research finds that these factors cause a hidden cultural strife within the child, and it creates a hybridity between the nannies’ culture and the parents’ culture, because the young child imitates the nanny in most of their actions. (National Education for Grade 9 2015, 22)
The reasons why non-working mothers rely on nannies is important to investigate. However, the discourse used to discuss foreign nannies does not push students to investigate the reasons for the use of foreign domestic help, and instead vilifies nannies for being a threat to an implied untainted Arab culture. The details of the research and the responsibility of the parents are not discussed in the textbook either, promoting the idea that such topics can be discussed in a simplistic and accusatory manner. In a similar vein, another paragraph discusses the ‘issues of foreign workers’ in general:
The problem of foreign labor takes the top of the list of problems and challenges that face UAE’s society, because of its effects on the economy, society, demographic imbalance, unemployment, and development. There is no doubt that foreign labor has contributed to a lot of the development goals of the country, and in implementing its programs and plans when there was no availability of a local workforce. Estimates point that foreign workers, which have increased from year 1999- 2004, have started causing pressure on services and public spaces. This result in an increase in government spending, the appearance of new lifestyles and actions that oppose the cultures and traditions, the dependence of locals on others and a negative outlook towards certain jobs, as well as increasing unemployment rates and limiting the work opportunities for the citizens of the country. (National Education for Grade 9 2015, 23).
Although there are mixed messages in the official narratives regarding how much influence foreign cultures have on the UAE, ranging from none to extreme, these depictions almost always show foreign influence on UAE society as negative, rather than presenting it as an opportunity for cultural enrichment. At times, the foreigners are presented in a villain-like manner for their suspicious role in altering an unadulterated Arab culture. This relates to Longva’s (1997, 2005) and Vora’s (2013) understandings of identity in the Gulf, wherein khaleeji identity is formed through its differentiation from the foreign populations who reside in the Gulf. These foreigners are viewed negatively, especially for their perceived role as a threat to local customs and traditions (Longva’s 1997, 2005). These are the very messages the textbooks promote.
Longva (2005) discussed the prevalence of these ideas in Kuwait, where Kuwaitis sense a threat to their ‘cultural integrity’ and to the ‘Kuwaiti way of life’ (122). She explains how the topic of identity and values are increasingly being promoted as urgent national issues (122). In the UAE, these messages are a recurring theme in newspapers and media, where there is a frenzy over topics of foreign populations or foreign marriage and how they threaten local values (Al Haddad 2010; Al Kuttab 2016; Sebugwaawo 2016; Sherif 2012). In an open university event with Federal National Council (FNC) members from the education, culture, and youth committee, presentations centered around the idea of promoting national identity. Much discussed was the topic of how private school students are weak in Arabic and how they are supposedly losing their identity amid foreign staff and students. Some of the students present at the event agreed with these ideas, and one student even suggested adding a camera to every classroom in her university to ensure that what goes on inside is true to local morals and values. Therefore, by comparing themselves to the foreign populations among them, Emiratis define themselves in relation to the other.
A further analysis of this topic may also show that Emiratis compare themselves to the foreign populations that reside within their societies so as to define themselves as superior in relation to them—a lens that Orientalists employ to define their own societies in opposition to the other. Foreign workers’ cultures and traditions are a threat in both views because they are different and supposedly morally inferior to the local ones. Analyzing whether this is indeed a form of reverse Orientalism is a discussion beyond the scope of this paper, but certainly requiring of an exploration of power and domination in this context. For present purposes, I observe that comparisons between domestic and foreign workers promote the idea that the native Emirati society is a single ethnicity with one culture and one history for all time. Indeed, instead of discussing the historical cosmopolitanism of the region and its rich diversity, the textbook states, ‘The great similarities in social relationships within Emirati society gave more strength to the union and support from its people’ (Social Studies and National Education for Grade 10 2015, 14).
Although there is constant referral to culture and identity in school books, there is no substantive discussion about what these terms actually mean. Yet, local cultures and traditions are still placed above all, and questioning them is considered almost blasphemous.
Conclusion
The UAE and Gulf region was historically a cosmopolitan society, with many influences from the countries of the Indian Ocean. These influences not only prove the transnational nature of the Gulf’s societies, but provide glimpses into a rich and vibrant culture and heritage. Unfortunately, these influences are not part of local representations today, and their dismissal leaves a very rigid and narrow interpretation of identity. Textbooks present Emirati students with the ideas that local culture is pure and unchanging and that foreign influence will damage that purity, promoting an identity that fosters intolerance of difference. By restricting the Emirati identity to a rigid definition, by ignoring parts of history, and by selectively and subjectively studying nation and culture, what is left of the local history and culture is a sanitized, romanticized, and ahistorical depiction of Emirati society with elements similar to Orientalist depictions of the region. However, this paper does not assume that current Emirati depictions are a logical consequence of Western Orientalist representations, although an investigation of this issue would be of great interest and importance.
Another worthy dimension from which to study this topic is Arab nationalism’s role in the promotion of a self-centered Arab history during the 1950-1970s and how such promotions may have affected perceptions of Emirati identity today. This is especially important as khaleeji Arab nationalists marginalized some of the local ethnic groups: for example, in Kuwait, Arab nationalists sought to revoke the citizenships of Ajami Kuwaitis (Al-Mdairis 1987, 291). However, Arab nationalists also viewed Bedouin culture as inferior. Therefore, Arab nationalist history in the Gulf alone cannot explain why the Bedouin narrative is privileged in the Gulf today, although it gives some clues to why other narratives might still be marginalized. Another example is al-Gurg’s statement about his pure Arab background (please refer to page 6). It is not clear whether his perceptions are due to the UAE government’s depictions of national identity today or due to the Nasserist Arabism that al-Gurg endorsed at a young age.
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