Sosa’s Safety, Halloween Party and the Backward Clock
I first review various early safety conditions originating with Sosa, showing that each is unsatisfactory. Next I show that that contrary to Comesaña and McBride, Halloween Party is not a counterexample to Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition. However Backward Clock shows that this condition is too weak. It also shows that McBride’s modification to Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition is too weak. Then I examine ways of supplementing or modifying safety conditions, showing that these are dead ends. I conclude that an analysis of knowledge in terms of safety conditions appears unpromising. I end by analysing Halloween Party as a case of lucky knowledge, that is, knowledge that one could easily have not had, rather than an easily false belief.
Moore’s Paradox for God
I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’, I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate and rebut three objections to my argument.
Omniscience, rationality, self-reference, Moore’s paradox, belief, knowledge
Date: 19 October 2017
Time: 2pm to 4pm
Venue: Philosophy Meeting Room (AS3-05-23)
About the Speaker:
John N. Williams is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University. He received his Ph.D. from Hull University, UK. His research interests include paradoxes, theory of knowledge, philosophy of religion and applied ethics. His research has been published in Acta Analytica, American Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Research, Logos and Episteme, Mind, Philosophia, Philosophy East and West, Philosophy Compass, Philosophical Studies, Religious Studies, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Synthese, and Theoria. He is a co-editor of Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person, Oxford University Press 2007.
All are welcome