“One’s Own Reasoning” by Michael G. Titelbaum on 22 April 2016

Responding to Cappelen and Dever’s claim that there is no distinctive role for perspectivality in epistemology, I will argue that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others’.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Friday, 22 April 2016
Time: 2pm – 4pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Michael G. Titelbaum
Moderator: Dr Qu Hsueh Ming

About the Speaker:

Michael G. Titelbaum is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University.  He works on epistemology (especially formal), ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, decision theory, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of logic.  His book Quitting Certainties received an Honourable Mention for the 2015 APA book prize; he is currently writing an introduction to Bayesian Epistemology.

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