Sometimes, it seems the proper response to evidence is to adopt an imprecise credence. Recently, a number of arguments purport to show that imprecise credences conflict with alethic monism. I claim that, on the contrary, imprecise credences, once properly understood, are compatible with alethic monism. Furthermore, this understanding reveals some important relationships between epistemic value and epistemic behaviour.

Philosophy Seminar Series
Date: Thursday, 28 January 2016
Time: 3pm – 5pm
Venue: AS3 #05-23
Speaker: Ben Levinstein
Moderator: Prof Neiladri Sinhababu

About the Speaker:

Ben Levinstein is currently a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford. Before that, he was a post-doc at Bristol University working on epistemic utility theory. His current interests include epistemology, decision theory, and ethics. He received a PhD from Rutgers in 2013.