This paper examines an argument to the conclusion that we should not adopt a “deep” theory of essences:  we should instead think that attributions of essence and essential properties are ultimately to be cashed out in other terms.  The argument examined is one that starts from the observation that some essence claims seem to be indeterminate.  We should accept that some of these claims are indeterminate; that the best explanation of this is provided by a broadly semantic theory of indeterminacy; and it will be argued that the best way of applying such an account of indeterminacy to the relevant cases results in a “shallow” theory of essence.

Philosophy Seminar Series.
Date: Friday, 28 Mar 2014
Time: 2 pm – 4 pm
Venue: Philosophy Resource Room (AS3 #05-23)
Speaker: Daniel Nolan, Australian National University
Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

About the Speaker:

Daniel Nolan is Professor of Philosophy and Deputy Head of the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University.  He is the author of Topics in the Philosophy of Possible Worlds (Routledge 2002), David Lewis (Acumen 2005), and articles on topics including metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophical logic, ethics and metaethics, and philosophy of language.