philosophy-at-nus

“From Boring Rationality to Rational Boredom: Giacomo Leopardi´s Critique of Enlightenment Philosophy” by Geir Sigurðsson

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 24 May 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Geir Sigurðsson, Associate Professor,  University of Iceland; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

Better known as one of Italy‘s greatest modern poets than a philosophical thinker, Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) is probably not included in many philosophical encyclopedias. However, Leopardi was indeed a peripheral philosopher living in one of the peripheries of Europe at the time. He was keenly aware of the dominant themes in Enlightenment philosophy, was profoundly critical of it, and even formulated an elaborate, albeit unsystematic, philosophical response, mainly in his chronological diaries, the Zibaldone di pensieri, but also in many of his essays, dialogues and aphorisms. This seminar will provide an outline of the Leopardian existential critique of the philosophical views dominating the late eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, in particular those found in German Idealism and Romanticism, and offer a comparison of Leopardi‘s and Kant‘s visions of the relationship between rationality and “boredom”, a prevalent topic in Leopardi‘s thought. If time allows, an outline will be provided of Leopardi‘s “ultraphilosophy”, as he chose to call it himself, a kind of philosophy meant to overcome the ills of the progressive philosophy of his day.

About the Speaker: Geir Sigurðsson has studied philosophy, social sciences and Chinese studies in Iceland, Ireland, Germany, China and the United States. He concluded his PhD in philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2004. Presently, he is head of program and associate professor in Chinese studies at University of Iceland, where he has a broad range of teaching obligations, but focuses in his research mainly on Confucianism, Daoism and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, while also taking an odd interest in peripheral Western thinkers. Having published a number of papers and translations in and out of his area of specialization, he is presently working on a monograph on ritualized action and education with an emphasis on Confucianism.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“Hume on Curiosity” by Axel Gelfert

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 10 May 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Axel Gelfert, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

Hume ends Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature with a section on the passion of curiosity, ‘that love of truth, which was the first source of all our enquiries’. At first sight, this characterisation of curiosity – as the motivating factor in that specifically human activity that is the pursuit of knowledge – may seem unoriginal. However, when Hume speaks of the ‘source of all our enquiries’, he is referring both to the universal human pursuit of knowledge and to his own philosophical project. Seen in this light, Hume’s discussion of curiosity takes on a new significance, as it weaves together elements of his systematic account of human nature – notably, his theory of cognition and motivation – with observations about the pursuit of philosophy as well as the progress of the arts and sciences. In the present paper, I offer a reconstruction of Hume’s view on curiosity and its role in cognition and inquiry.

About the Speaker: Axel Gelfert is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore and Co-Chair of the Science, Technology, and Society (STS) Research Cluster at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Since 2011, he has also been an Associate Fellow at Tembusu College. He completed his PhD in History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge in 2005, after which he spent a year as a Junior Fellow at Collegium Budapest (Institute for Advanced Study), before arriving at NUS in 2006. His research and teaching revolve around issues in the philosophy of science and technology, social epistemology, and history of philosophy.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“Moral Reasons and Reasons to Be Moral” by Andres Luco

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 3 May 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Andres Luco, Assistant Professor, Philosophy Group, Nanyang Technological University; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

If you have a moral duty to do something, does it necessarily follow that you have a reason to do it? Contrary to most moral philosophers, I contend that the answer is “no.” I defend the view that morality and practical rationality are independent systems of normative evaluation. Thus, there can be a moral reason that an agent should do X, while the agent has no practical reason to do X. This view is supported by three sets of considerations: (1) intuitions about the possibility of rational evil, (2) the common experience of being alienated from one’s moral duties, and (3) the fact that moral norms have the function of promoting behaviors that are group-beneficial, but not necessarily beneficial to any particular individual.

About the Speaker: Andres Luco is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Group at Nanyang Technological University. He has previously taught philosophy at North Carolina State University and the University of Cape Town.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“Creativity and the Negative Emotions” by Derek Matravers

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 26 Apr 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Derek Matravers, Professor of Philosophy, The Open University; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

Recent work by Malcolm Budd, Aaron Smuts, and others has shown the so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ (the conjunction of the claims that we willingly submit ourselves to painful art and the hedonic view of motivation) is no such thing. What remains, according to Smuts, is the ‘motivation question’ (‘Why do people want to see painful art?’) and the ‘difference question’ (Why do people subject themselves to things in art that they would not in real life?’). This paper argues that this obscures the deeper role of negative emotions in art: that they are essential for creativity. Drawing on the work on Richard Wollheim, this paper sketches an account of artistic creativity that draws on the work of Melanie Klein and Hannah Segal. Along the way, it has something to say about the role of intention in interpretation, before answering Smuts’
two questions.

About the Speaker: Derek Matravers is Professor of Philosophy at The Open University and Bye-Fellow and Director of Studies at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. He current interests lie in aesthetics; particularly with fiction and narrative. His introduction to the Philosophy of Art is about to appear with Acumen Press and his book, Fiction and Narrative, will appear with OUP next year. He is the author of Art and Emotion (1998, Clarendon Press), as well as numerous articles in aesthetics, ethics and the philosophy of mind.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“Human Nature and Social Construction: 17th-Century Cases” by Knud Haakonssen

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 19 Apr 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Knud Haakonssen, Professor Emeritus of Intellectual History at the University of Sussex; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

Does language presuppose social relations, or do social relations presuppose language? During the Enlightenment, there was an intense preoccupation with the relationship between linguistic ability and sociability. By the middle of the eighteenth century it was a common idea that communicative interaction was the core of social living and, as largely a distinctive feature of humanity, this meant that human life without society was seen as an idle fiction (Hume). These theories of the character of social phenomena had a pre-history in seventeenth-century contract theories, and it is with aspects of this earlier story that I am concerned in this paper.

 

Early-modern contract theory did not come into the world fully fledged, nor was it one theory, but several significantly different ones. The articulation of a language in which social relations, especially authority, could be understood in contractual terms of some sort was a difficult process and by no means a coherent and linear one. We have to attend to individual episodes when particular argumentative needs were met through adaptation of the general language of contract. Against the background of a brief sketch of Thomas Hobbes’s commonly misunderstood idea a demonstrative science of morals and its implication for his idea of contractual explanation, I will look in particular at the use that Locke’s great contemporary, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), made of a comparable methodology in a situation that was different from that faced by Hobbes. For politico-theological reasons Pufendorf was motivated to eliminate not only metaphysical assumptions about the individuals in contractual relations, but also ‘naturalistic’ assumptions such as those of Hobbes. This led him into radical ideas of the minimal imaginable requirement for being a human agent capable of having contractual relations.

About the Speaker: Knud Haakonssen is Professor Emeritus of Intellectual History at the University of Sussex, Honorary Professor of History at University College London, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, and a Long-term Fellow of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in Uppsala. He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences & Letters, and the Royal Historical Society. Professor Haakonssen has worked extensively on the history of moral, political and legal thought with special emphasis on the Enlightenment in Scotland, England, Germany and Scandinavia.

 

 More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“Liberty and Diversity” by Chandran Kukathas

Philosophy Seminar Series: Tuessday, 17 Apr 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Chandran Kukathas, Chair in Political Theory, Department of Government, London School of Economics; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

The Mill of On Liberty is convinced that diversity, far from being a threat to liberty, gives liberty its point. What could matter more than human development in its richest diversity; and how better to promote it than by a regime of liberty that leaves people to pursue their own goals as they see fit? But the Mill of the Considerations worries that, left to their own devices and desires, people will not become sufficiently alike to be governed as a single collectivity, or develop sufficient virtue to be governed at all. Libertarian though he is, Mill cannot help think that the government of a free society must take upon itself the task of fostering the qualities necessary for all individuals to possess for the society to prosper.

If freedom matters, and matters above all, should we seek to ensure that a free society is populated by people who appreciate its importance, or at least possess the qualities and attitudes needed to sustain it? Or, if freedom matters, and matters above all, should we let freedom find expression in the great diversity of human attitudes to all things, including freedom? Should people be forced to be free? Or if not forced, at least induced (threatened, tricked, cajoled, bribed, manipulated, or generally educated) into that condition? This paper offers an answer.

About the Speaker: Chandran Kukathas holds the Chair in Political Theory in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and is Visiting Professor in the Departments of Political Science and of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. He is the author of The Liberal Archipelago.

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“The Problem of Choice in the Analects” by So Young Moon

Graduate Seminar Series: 3 Apr 2012, 3-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: So Young Moon, PhD Student

Abstract:

A discourse on the problem of choice in Confucian ethic system has been contentious topic since the last 20th century. In this presentation, I will examine different point of views on the problem of choice in Confucian philosophy by several scholars and present my view on this problem especially in the Analects. The notion of choice in the Analects does not have the same implications of Western notion of choice. What I want to focus on in this presentation is that how the problem of choice can be viewed in the Analects and how this view differs from those of Western traditions.

About the Speaker: So Young holds an MA from Sungkyunkwan University in South Korea. Her study is mainly in early Confucian philosophy, and she wrote her MA thesis on Confucius’ renxue in the Analects. Her current research interests in NUS are early Chinese philosophy, including Confucianism, Daoism, and thoughts of the other schools in the pre-Qin period. Also, she is interested in Comparative Philosophy and Ethics.

“On Using Moral Intuitions in Philosophy” by Sulastri Noordin (GRS Presentation)

Graduate Seminar Series: 3 Apr 2012, 2-3pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Sulastri Noordin, MA Student

Abstract:

In this talk, I will present a small part of my dissertation project. It is common philosophical practice to apply moral principles to particular situations, and then to compare the moral judgements generated to people’s intuitive moral judgements about the same situations. I seek to clarify what exactly it is that philosophers are doing with intuitions when they carry out this practice. I claim that they could be doing at least two things: (i) treating moral intuitions as phenomena, which it is the job of moral theories to simply describe/systematise, or (ii) treating moral intuitions as independent evidence in support of or against moral theories. I will attempt to establish what conditions have to hold, in order for moral intuitions to properly serve these uses.

About the Speaker: Sulastri is working towards her Masters degree. She received her BA (Hons) in philosophy from NUS, where she was awarded the Philosophy Book Prize. Sulastri’s particular area of interest is in philosophical methodology. Her dissertation project examines the use of moral intuitions in ethics. To that end, her interests also extend to moral psychology, experimental philosophy, and heuristics and cognitive biases, in hopes of finding interdisciplinary work that sheds light on methodological issues in philosophy. She lives in a quiet neighbourhood with her cat, Immanuel.

“What is an author?” by Paisley Livingston

Philosophy Seminar Series: Thursday, 29 Mar 2012, 2-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Paisley Livingston, Chair Professor and Head of Department, Department of Philosophy, Lingan University, Hong Kong; Moderator: Dr. Ben Blumson

Abstract:

Although Michel Foucault’s essay on this question was published over 40 years ago, some of the opinions he advanced in it remain quite prominent in the literature. In my talk I present new criticisms of Foucauldian positions and propose an alternative explication of authorship. I identify historical and conceptual problems in Foucault. With reference to cases of ‘ghost’ and ‘gift’ authorship, I outline and defend an action-theoretical elucidation of both individual and joint authorship.

About the Speaker: Paisley Livingston (BA Stanford, PhD Johns Hopkins) is Chair Professor and Head of Philosophy at Lingnan University. Before moving to Hong Kong in 2001 he taught in the philosophy department at the University of Copenhagen. He was previously Full Professor at McGill University and also taught at Aarhus University, the University of Michigan, and Roskilde University. He has held research positions at CREA, l’École Polytechnique, Paris, and Zinbun, Kyoto, and was a guest professor at Siegen University in Germany.

His books include Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film as Philosophy (Oxford University Press), Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford Clarendon Press), Models of Desire: René Girard and the Psychology of Mimesis (The Johns Hopkins University Press), Literature and Rationality: Ideas of Agency in Theory and Fiction (Cambridge University Press), and Literary Knowledge: Humanistic Inquiry and the Philosophy of Science (Cornell University Press). With Berys Gaut he co-editedThe Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Cambridge University Press), and with Carl Platinga,The Routledge Companion to Film and Philosophy (Routledge).

More information on the Philosophy Seminar Series can be found here. A list of past talks in the series can be found here.

“On Thought Experiments” by Lim Chong Ming

Graduate Seminar Series: 27 Mar 2012, 3-4pm, Philosophy Resource Room; Speaker: Lim Chong Ming, MA Student

Abstract:

Thought experiments are frequently used in philosophy, and at many times stand in for arguments. In this presentation, I will examine some specific thought experiments while attempting to construct a suitably general framework that can be used to understand thought experiments. This will hopefully allow the subsequent assessment of their plausibility and efficacy to be carried out.

chong mingAbout the Speaker: Chong Ming’s primary interests centre on political philosophy and ethics. Currently, he is working on issues pertaining to distributive justice, with particular focus on the process of justification within the contractarian framework. He is also interested in Early Chinese Philosophy and 20th Century Continental philosophy, among others.

More information on the Graduate Seminar Series can be found here.